Panel 2: Nuclear Disarmament – From Statements to Facts
October 29, 2009

Peter Hakim: - I am Peter Hakim, from Inter-American Dialogue. I live in Washington but I am very glad to be back here in Rio to participate of this conference with so many analysts and distinguished officials. I want to thank first and foremost to the CEBRI that invited me to participate and also NPSGlobal, which is also one of the organizers. We've had a debate over whether I should speak in Portuguese or in English. Well the good news is the English won. But I suppose that if I stay more to days I would speak only Portuguese. I'll make sure of that.

Let me just say that this second panel is slightly different and has a different purpose than the First Panel. I think that the First Panel, and I came in a little late, right from the airport, but the First Panel sounded to me optimistic about the future, that they set out a certain set of goals that nuclear armament's regime, nuclear disarmament rules that ought to be pursued and the sense was that they would be pursued. I think as I read the background to the Second panel, I get the sense that it's going to be more realistic than optimistic. I may be wrong, but it's going to be up to the panelists to decide, but my sense is that now we are not looking at objectives and goals of the nuclear regime, the nuclear weapons regime, but rather beginning to look at what the commitments and the actions that have to be taken by the nuclear weapons states and by the non-nuclear weapons states. We are going to be looking at what the attitudes and policies of the states are and also the internal context, the domestic political context of those states, and the regional context in which they have to operate. So all that is gonna shape how they look at these issues. The expected outcome of this is really designed to try to provide a clear, or at least an informed idea of how to expect the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapon states to behave in the coming period, and how they are looking toward the Non-proliferation Treaty Review. And this should begin to give us some clues, some evidence of what the practicality, the feasibility, the likelihood of real progress toward nuclear disarmament. So with that, I would very quickly like to introduce this very distinguished panel and let me start to my immediate right here, B.S. Prakash has been Ambassador of India to Brazil for the past year and he has had a wide number of diplomatic positions before that. I could give you a long list and you would hear capitals all around the globe. He has done a lot of work with the United Nations and has focused very hard in parts of his career on multilateral issues. He was India's alternative reference to the International Agency for Atomic Energy. So he has a terrific background and we are delighted he is here. On my immediate left is Dingli Shen, a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai. The Director of the University's American Studies Center and the Dean of the Institute of International Studies. He is the founder or co-founder, he is very modest in his biography, and director of China's first nongovernment based program on arms control and regional security. His research areas cover a wide range of issues on nonproliferation international security, and China's foreign policy. If there is anybody that can put China's nuclear policy toward disarmament in context its Mr. Dingli Shen. Thank you for joining us today. My further right, only in geography, is Vladimir Orlov is a founder and president of the Russian Center of Political Studies, the editor-in-chief for Security Index Journal, and president for the Russian Center for Political Studies. He helped found the PIR Center, now you are going to have to tell me what the PIR Center is.
Vladimir Orlov: -I'll tell it in my presentation. [with humor]

Peter Hakim: -Okay. This is going to be a secret until he talks. It's very emphasized here and I didn't want to pass over it and I congratulate you on founding it. He also launched, in his career, a Russian journal on the International Security Index and I could go on and on. His biography tends to be longer than the others which are probably a good thing; we are delighted that you are here, Vladimir [with humor]. Finally on my extreme left, again geographically Rafael Grossi, is Plenipotentiary Minister of the Argentine Foreign Service and the Director General of Policy Coordination. Basically, he is in charge of strategic policy in the Foreign Ministry. He has also worked for a long time on nuclear weapon issues, nuclear energy and he is the again he has a long biography here. Let me say he had representational responsibility in a wide variety of ways, and let me just mention the Commission for Disarmament and the International Association of Atomic Energy, and NATO. Again, somebody who will be very able to put Argentina's thinking about nuclear weapons in a strong political and strategic context. Thank you for joining us. Why don't we proceed in pretty much the order that I introduced you, if that is ok? You are first.

B.S. Prakash: -Thank you Chair. It is a delight to be here. For someone like me who lives in Brasilia, it is always great to come to a real city like Rio from time to time. And thank you for inviting me to this very important conference. My purpose, my objective will be to present an Indian perspective on nuclear matters. This panel is somewhat enigmatically titled from statements to facts. I believe that I am really going to state some facts and not make a statement when I say that India's nuclear policy and posture is somewhat distinctive.

Let me begin with four facts. One, India has, from its independence in 1947, consistently believed in the goal but also in the real possibility of a world without nuclear weapons. Number two, India has significant nuclear capabilities and is today a nuclear weapon state. It is India's policy at present to maintain a credible minimum deterrence. Three, we have consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear power in the energy mix. Four, we are nonbelievers in the NPT, while fully recognizing and adhering to the principles of nonproliferation. But we are not believers in the Nonproliferation Treaty. If these are the facts, how does one understand India's policy and evolution of India's nuclear thinking? This is what I will try to do in the next ten minutes or so.

Actually form me a good starting point is the very present, the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1887 about a month ago. As we know, this is a very substantive resolution with many specific objectives about nonproliferation and disarmament, but at the core of it, the kernel of it, the substance of it is also driven by what the earlier panel discussed. And that is this very powerful movement now, when there is a vision fully articulated by President Obama in the Prague speeches that we saw for a nuclear weapons free world. It is equally striking that the Cold War stalwarts like Kissinger, William Perry, George Schultz, many others, Richard Lugar, are now talking about this kind of a vision. So it is as the earlier panelists pointed out, a significant point in time. I must state that this vision of the possibility of a nuclear weapon's free world is something that India has consistently believed in. I must state, and I am not being rhetorical here but stating a fact, the father of India, the father of our nation is Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of nonviolence. But Gandhi was in the late 47/48, but Nehru was the India's Prime Minister that shared this vision and he was also a powerful proponent of a nuclear weapon's free world. India was the first to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1956 at the UNGA, and India asked for a non-discriminating treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in 1965. These were early years in India, and this was a kind of a vision that was not shared by very many. But lately we come to more contemporary periods. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988, at the UNGA, laid out a map for steps toward nuclear disarmament, complete and universal nuclear disarmament, and came up with a vision and a plan. We are committed to this plan.
A month ago the current Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, inaugurating a conference on peaceful use of nuclear energy at an international conference in Mumbai, once again spoke of India's commitment and Rajiv Gandhi's action plan in 1988, and reiterated our belief in the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. So, if I am saying all of this, so if this is India's vision, then how do we understand India being a significant nuclear state? I think to understand this approach; I can do no better that to quote a word from the Brazilian National Defense Strategy.

As many of you may know, President Lula unveiled this just a few months ago, the Brazilian National Defense Strategy. I quote from this, the Strategy says: "the nuclear sector is of strategic value by its very nature, it transcends the limits between development and defense." This is from the Brazilian strategy. Now, this has always been India's strategy that this is a sector that transcends development and defense. We were lucky from the very beginning of the 1950's to have one of the world's most upmost nuclear physicists and scientists, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha who really started one of India’s programs in the 50's, and he was driven by this vision of -for a country like India, for a developing country- the importance of nuclear power. In 1955, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha said, let me give a short quotation: "For the full industrialization of developing countries, or underdeveloped countries as they were called then, atomic energy is not be only an option but an absolute necessity." So, on the one hand there was this belief in nuclear power. The second was the fact that we are after all one-sixth of humanity, more than a billion people, one-sixth of humanity with a certain amount of intellectual capital and investment in science and technology and ability. So there was this belief that we cannot deny ourselves any technology, any technology which other countries have the right to possess and use, and that we should not give up that option. And the third was the geopolitical reality starting from 1960's, when our larger neighbor possessed nuclear power in 1964.

So these are the factors, which really underlie our decision in 1974, when the first test was connected but without explicitly characterizing the nature of that test. I think all these three, four points are relevant in understanding India's position with regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a very well informed audience and I don't think that I really need to spell out the basics of our non-belief in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Essentially that this is a Treaty which is discriminatory and which is unfair, and that it divides the world forever -the world into nuclear “have's” and “have not’s”- and denies us certain capabilities, and therefore we have steadfastly opposed it or not believed in it, nor adhered to it, despite paying enormous costs to ourselves in terms to technology denials: denial of access to materials, political and economic pressures, sort of sanctions, and everything else.

Let me say this, though we don't believe in the NPT our nonproliferation commitment, and our track record is impeccable, I believe that the world truly accepts that India did not cheat, did not steal, did not have a clandestine program. We did not leak, we did not provide to others despite, sometimes blandishments that were offered. In one word, we believe that we do believe in non-proliferation but we do not believe in the NPT, in the Treaty. I think this is the background to really understand the Indian-US nuclear agreement of last year and the waivers and the exemptions of the international community and the NSG has offered to us. I heard in the morning, and this did not come as a surprise, others in this Seminar who feels that this was not a good thing. You will not be surprised that my own view or another view is different. But to the question as to why India has been treated specially, and there has been a special carve-out for India, why there has been a special exemption for India, my answer would be very simple. It is because India's case is indeed special, and let me again just mentioning three or four aspects. One, our nuclear program has been developed indigenously without, as I said without, any duplicity. Also our nonproliferation track record is impeccable. I think that IAEA and the NSG recognize this.
Number two, India's energy requirements, if for a billion people we are growing at a rate of 8 or 9 percent and this has been the rate of economic growth in India for the last ten-years or so, except this year. The energy needs are massive and India has an obligation to its people to explore every energy option that it can, including the nuclear option. So we have an ambitious nuclear power program, a three stage nuclear program including use of plutonium resources in the last phase. I think the exemption that India has got would result in the redemption of carbon emissions. So nuclear energy as we all know is one of the cleaner options of energy, and for a country like India it is absolutely essential that we exploit this. And this would be India's contribution also to the issue of environmental and climate change.

Number three, we accept now, and this is important, we have accepted the separation of the civil and the strategic program. All of India's civil programs will come under the IAEA safeguards. In fact the IAEA activities in India under the safeguard’s agreement will see a substantial increase so in a word, from being an outlier, from being somebody who is a non participant in the international system or mainframe -in regards to nonproliferation-, today India is a participant.

And I must take this occasion to thank all the countries that supported us in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, particularly Brazil which played a very crucial role and many other countries as well, and since then, last year we have signed seven nuclear agreements, the last being with Argentina when the President of Argentina was in India just two or three weeks ago. We have seven of such nuclear agreements, and we are happy today that this unfair denial of technology and material to which we were subjected is no longer something that is being inflicted on us.

I come to the last part of my presentation, Mr. Chair. How do we in India look at some of the contemporary challenges and contemporary issues in the nuclear field? First of all, let me say that we live in a very dangerous and turbulent neighborhood. To the very West of India, to the immediate West, is the epicenter for nuclear terrorism: Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Now the danger that other panelists spoke of this morning is an existent reality for us. So this worry about nuclear material falling into the wrong hands and terrorists and other non-state actors is a worry for us, maybe in a more magnified sense than those who are more distant. This is something that we need to monitor and also something that we need to work with the international community. But it is not just the terrorists, it is not just the non-state actors, but I think that there is enough evidence to show that there are structures and entities outside the government. The famous AQ Khan example comes into mind. Let's say autonomous entities and structures that are also equal sources of danger, it's not just the terrorists, it's just parts of the establishment that are rogue, or which are outside civilian control. And, to minimize that kind of a danger or to have effective command and control systems is another major danger and an issue to be addressed.

The third is the real possibility of escalation of nuclear danger, and especially in our neighborhood. India's contribution is a declared no first use policy and I think it is consistent to the policy of maintaining credible minimum deterrence with no first use. We are also diplomatically very active in trying to normalize the situation with confidence building measures and other kinds of dialogue, whatever is possible to see that the stabilization takes place in our region.

Let me make one point, in this Seminar, since we are taking about nuclear matters, we are only talking about the dangers that are related to the nuclear field, and I would think that we should not forget that there is kind of an elemental danger in the clashes and conflicts that are taking place in Afghanistan, yesterday for instance. This is independent of the nuclear field. The kind of struggle that is taking place is really for normalcy and stability and for civilized norms between something that should be outside the pail, between extremists, fundamentalists and highly dangerous forces. Of course the nuclear dimension magnifies it, but we must not believe that we need to address only that question as diplomats; we must address the more fundamental problems of instability and of lack of peace in this region.

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Another worry that we share with the rest of the world is really about nuclear security and we will be active participants in the Nuclear Security Summit, which will take place in the next year.

So, let me end with my concluding thoughts, we live in a dangerous neighborhood as I said but we do see some elements, which lend to optimism. I think some of the issues mentioned in the UN Security Council Resolution, and some of the issues that are already outlined this morning are very important.

On India’s part we have declared an unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and I don't think we have interests in testing anymore, so we are committed to the moratorium on nuclear testing. On the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, we have declared as policy that we do believe in a defense treaty which is universal, which is global, which is nondiscriminatory, and verifiable. We will be active partners in this. And in the multilateral agenda in the UN and in the CD we have already a paper -which I think the experts would know- which has a kind of step by step measures towards disarmament, which I think India propagates.

We believe in it and commonalities with India's approach with other approaches that other countries have. I will end with this; just let me mention one or two points from our working paper. This relates to reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrine. It also talks about a Nuclear Weapons Convention in which we are interested, we would support that, and other kinds of both legal and other kinds of instrumentalities which would be steps toward disarmament. So, thank you for you patient listening. I am happy that in the previous conferences of this nature, which I had to attend, we were in a different position. But today we thank the international community and the experts from many countries who saw the reality of India's nuclear doctrine. And with the agreements of the NSG, and with the agreements that we already have with countries, and the agreements that we have in the pipeline, I think that India will be a major participant in both in nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, thank you very much.

Peter Hakim: -Thank you very much Mr. Ambassador. Before we go on, can I just ask you one small question? The first thing that you said and you reiterated it a couple of times, is that India is interested and wants to pursue a world without nuclear weapons, but you didn't really state how you get there. In other words your list of things is more to a juridical regime to prevent the use, to reduce the use, but not how to move toward elimination. Do you want to take two seconds and just say?

B.S. Prakash: -I think that to be authoritative, all what I can do Chair, is to read out the seven or eight steps from our working paper which was admitted to the UN, but I don't really state how you get there. In other words your list of things is more to a juridical regime to prevent the use, to reduce the use, but not how to move toward elimination. Do you want to take two seconds and just say?

Peter Hakim: -Mr. Dingli Shen

Dingli Shen: -Thank you Mr. Chair and thank you to the organizations that have invited me and have made an effort to make me to appear here. I come from Fudan University which is Shanghai based, the Center for American Studies. This is my first time to go to South America. Our University is proud to host the University of California Assistant Wide China Program; they have the China office at our center. I told the professor Miles Kahler of UC San Diego, "I am going to Brazil." He told me, "If you go to Brazil, you have to go to Rio." So I am here, discussing the issue of nuclear disarmament.

I guess the organizers hope that I would discuss this issue because I come from a country that has nuclear weapons. But to make of my 15 or 20 minutes full of substance, I am going to make four points. One, how China, well actually, how I view the nuclear disarmament of major nuclear weapons states, namely US and Russia. And second, how I consider that China has its own view concerning China’s
own nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Third, there is proliferation, especially in China's periphery. If proliferation could be described as a physical phenomenon that you change a status to another status in which there is a transition from being without and having no nuclear weapons to having nuclear weapons. If this is defined as proliferation, then after China, China's neighborhood has India, Pakistan, and North Korea to have had nuclear weapons. But India may feel that its case does not constitute a nuclear proliferation, because it has used its own system, not to transfer a system from outside the country or to move to outside the country as it has stated. So I would at a certain point address how we look at North Korea. Then in the end, how the two issues could be linked, nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Of course, it is extremely important to address nonproliferation alone, but without deeper nuclear disarmament or to make the world, or to make nuclear weapon states free of nuclear weapons. Better worded would be not help for but to speak to new weapons states, to keep the status being without nuclear weapon and the two should cooperate, they should have some synergy.

First of all we have to look at President Obama's April speech. I think Vladimir and I were on the same panel at the Carnegie Endowment Conference this April, a day after the President made his speech. I think, I and other panelists were thrilled and felt encouraged that we have waited for a long time to get this positive message. Such a speech I think, you also perceived it a bit, is very politically correct, moving in the right direction. Carried the word that nuclear weapon states have a will and they feel of responsibility to disarm themselves, and at the same time to work with others to make the entire world free of nuclear weapons. US is taking the right leadership and I think the Chinese side, in my view - I cannot represent the Chinese government but in my view - the Chinese government shares or has already encouraged this systematically, and we can take part on the commentary.

At the same time, if we look at the realities, because this is a discussion from statements to facts, the US still maintains in active service, plus the reserve, a stockpile of thousands of strategic systems (probably between four thousand to six thousand) around that level. That has to give us any case to follow on to, to have a big job to do, to reduce security level to much a lower level to have a lot of job to do. And US and Russia are going to define how much of that they are going to do probably by the end of this year. So these are my first points, good developments will be encouraged but also we think that US will take years to accomplish a possible positive outcome from a Treaty to be made by the end of this year.

Second point, as a medium nuclear weapon state... What China has done in the context of nuclear disarmament? Has China cut its own nuclear weapons or built more nuclear weapons? All of these are top national secrets. I'm not entitled to understand so I could address this issue through all openly available resources.

It’s understood exactly that China is modernizing its strategic system -Chinese government may be unhappy if a web site could have printed this, but I read it from an open source- specially through modernizing its SSBN to research, develop, manufacture, possibly to employ newer class of strategic submarine in the next few years. Some people might feel critical that why China is doing this, when other countries are going down. But I want to say, this may or may not be reported correctly, I cannot neither confirm this nor deny this. I would only say citing from public sources I can count a few.

At the same time, there has not been much reported that China is increasing its strategic arsenal. Various estimates indicate that China has probably acquired, deployed the force around the one hundred to two hundred at a few hundred level, largely about two hundred. But of course any potential modernization of a (...) system China could expand its overall force quite dramatically if China is willing to do so. Major sources indicate that even though China’s economy is improving, and China could be less financially restrained upon making decisions to expand its strategic force significantly, China might
have not done it, might still keep its deployed strategic systems at a low level, sustaining its minimum deterrence strategy.

So, all the time China was poor. China did not have much fissile material, did not have much money to fuel its warhead delivery system. Now, China has had, why China is not doing? Of course I cannot confirm or deny that China is not doing. I could only say, gathering from open sources, my feeling is that China is not doing it. Probably, because China’s view is that, too. We trust all nuclear weapons states are believers of deterrence and a result...what a proof? What will other proof than our missile defense, limited all minimum nuclear deterrence for the so Fives as long as we don’t want to be dominant. Our country’s economy is only probably 30% of the US. Per capita is probably 7% on GDP of US, China is not in a position to dominate, and it would not be in a position to dominate in the next several ten or so years.

Why should we pursue a strategy to be aggressive and to be dominant, to spend our resources that something will not improve the security of our neighbors, and of China itself? Why would we do it? So we continue to stick to our old doctrine that is: minimal nuclear deterrence. Primarily, we felt threatened during the 1950s. Before I was born, during the Korean War, the US, few of the commanders threatened China, threatening to use nuclear weapons against Chinese territory, even without the authority of the US president. And when China was sympathetic with Vietnamese during the decolonization war to get independence from France, it’s on the records that US has also threatened China to use nuclear weapons against China. And during artillery shell exchange between the Chinese mainland and the Nationalist-controlled Kinmen and Matsu islands, the US, and was also on the records to have threatened China. And this may not be authorized by the US president at all. But it could have turned China’s vision of nuclear weapon from being a paper tiger to a real tiger. So we changed our stands to develop a nuclear weapon. But since 1964 when China exploded its first nuclear weapon, we have maintained a very small, modest nuclear arsenal.

So concerning the CTBT I would query that, as I stated at the Carnegie meeting, why we can not ratify the treaty before the US would do. I still need to make effort to persuade my government to think about the need that we shall do it before the US would do. While we shall not be an obstacle for the CTBT to enter into force, we shall be the force to promote it to be ratified as early as possible. So if the US were to do it, we would do it. We shall not need to wait for the US to do first..

Fissile Materials Cut-off. About twenty years ago, China has suspended its production of weapons grade fissile materials. Reportedly China has not re-opened such a production. And I hope this would continue to be the case. China has seems to have soften its position at a CD based for negotiation for a global ban on fissile material production. And, our current stockpile frozen since two decades ago. Actually it gives a ceiling of the total of nuclear weapons China could have, also contributing to global nuclear arms control.

So for as … how to look at our neighbors to develop nuclear weapons. China’s perspectives have been changing from being sympathetically with some of them because they feel threatened so they had some threat perception that couldn’t explain that behavior. And we think DPRK’s nuclear developing material in an issue only between DPRK and America. Such was our view until a few years ago. So why China matters? The present view is that even we do not matter we are explaining why DPRK developed. We would be happy being mattered, being explained how DPRK has disarmed its nuclear weapon program by participating and by walking with other states during this process.

So in the last 7 years China has been walking on the so called Six Party Talks. Our Premier Wen Jiabao went be to DPRK on October 4th, a few days after China celebrates its sixtieth anniversary, to speak to DPRK friends that we care of this issue and we hope it as I said it would abandon it. At the same time
the legitimate security concern also should be respected, and we has to play this balanced role in making DPRK to feel secure and also towards to make its own security policy, to make China to feel more secure, making our other partners to feel more secure. Eventually DPRK made the statement that if it’s talked by a bilateral protocol at a future time, probably be prepared by US and the DPRK in Washington, New York, or San Diego. Because they say they are going to return to some kind multilateral mechanism possibly including the Six Party Talks.

So, lots of uncertainties first of with which there are future talk with America what it goes smoothly and that would make both of them to feel less security concerned, and they would come to a certain type of multilateral talk, hopefully a Six Party Talks.

My final point is that how nuclear disarmament could contribute to nuclear non-proliferation. US has thousands of nuclear weapons. According to an open estimate about China’s deployed systems the number might be 3 to 5% of the US at this time. This is small but that doesn’t mean we have no responsibility. If we keep modernizing, if we keep lifting the number, and the quality of the systems it is hard to say why they should not develop. But how nuclear weapons states could speak to each other in an assuring way, as James Steinberg spoke on September 24th at Center for a New American Security that China and the US should give strategically reassurance. We shall reassure each other that we would not have a hedging strategy or potentially be involved in a potentially very dangerous relationship, especially due to the uncertainties of the future.

So China and the US of course are members of the nuclear weapon states. I would have talked within unlimited time China and the US need to make efforts to assure each other that we don’t have the hostility and we want to have a transparent open policy in explaining ourselves and restraining our nuclear stands, in order to assure others would do similarly. So the question is important for China and the US to be rational and to seek a restrained position toward removing this issue eventually. As these days there is a senior Chinese military delegation visiting in America, the chief of the delegation spoke at the CSRS or internally with the Secretaries of Defense. China hopes that the US would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan, and would eventually stop.

In the meantime, all nuclear weapon states including China and the US need to talk on a strategic offense and defense. I would say that all defenses are legitimate and understandable, but offense plus defense would create some complexity for other countries to address. So why no country should veto other countries’ legitimate makings of security policy…but all stakeholders should be sensible in making their security policy, taking care of the response of the other countries that would eventually affect the first country. India’s Ambassador has mentioned India’s “no first use”, which should be commended. So, my country has difficulty at admitting India as a nuclear weapons state on the NPT, and India has no interest in admitting the legality of the Treaty at all. We always stipulate and propose to have a global and active of security assurance and mechanism to expand to the level to no first use. So America has had a very encouraging President and I hope this president extends his wisdom to a deeper activity in the security assurance arena as well. Thank you very much.

Peter Hakim: -Thank you very much for this comprehensive view. It’s very much appreciated. Vladimir Orlov.

Vladimir Orlov: -Good morning or good afternoon (in Spanish). I’m very glad to be here in Rio de Janeiro and the Chairman while introducing me said that I’m with the PIR center in Moscow, which is a Russian think tank. Although it sounds “pir” it has nothing to do with the piranhas or caipirinhas although some of us in Moscow do believe already that caipirinha has become a Russian national drink so we have many things to share with our Brazilian friends. PIR Center stands for a policy studies in Russia. This is the Russian Acronym for this word, in fact we deal with the international security agenda to the
degrees that affect Russian strategic decision making and of course non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is on top of that list. I have to make a disclaimer that though I'm a member of the Russian delegation to the upcoming NPT Review Conference and I’m on the Board of Direction Defense Ministry, I will speak only in my personal capacity reflecting only my views and no other views neither official, nor of the PIR center. We don’t have a strategy there, so each speaks for ourselves.

I came here not from Moscow, I came here from Geneva. I had to make a stop there over the weekend and to meet with the heads of Russian and US delegations Rose Gottemoeller and Anatoly Antonov who worked the very hard on trying to build a new treaty, START replacement treaty, and not only to build it but to build it by the deadline the two presidents put to them, by December 5th. And, it is true that negotiations, that the talks, they don't go easy. There are still issues which are unresolved. But I should say that on my way from Geneva to Rio, I was already moving in a better, in a more optimistic mood. Let’s say realistically optimistic mood about the fact that there is a high chance that we will have by December 5th not a general framework agreement, which would give longer time for negotiators, but we hopefully will have a new treaty signed.

It is true as well that it is a very interesting timing of that opportunities, for the next few months, whether it is twelve months or around that, it remains to be seen but there is a window of opportunity. We do see it in Moscow as well as our friends and colleagues see it in Obama’s Washington. However we also understand that the policies may be promoted by administrations but they are made by the states and of course administrations here and there come and go. We also understand that this window of opportunity may shut down and sometimes they call a wind opportunity which not just blows, but it may change direction. So we really should work very hard not to have that momentum disappear since we both, bilateral Russia and the United States, are the main shareholders on the nuclear weapons club but also all the international community, because article 6 of the NPT, Disarmament article of the NPT, is responsibility by the five, but also responsibility by all members of the Treaty.

And with that positive mood in mind, I also have some warning and this warning comes from history. Maybe some of you already had the chance to read an new excellent book by David Hoffman which is called Dead Hand on the history of the Cold War in the 1980s and further on of the way to avoiding the Cold War scenario to a more…to a better dialogue between Soviet Union and the United States, Russia and the United States. So the book indicates that the main problems related to nuclear weapons even when countries were close to use nuclear weapons, to push the bottom were coming not from bad decisions, but from wrong perceptions. In this sense I think, it is really very good that currently we see in Washington administration which is intellectually much better fit for the job and actually ready for a dialogue to build long lasting solutions.

From my country’s stand point, from Russia stand point, nuclear disarmament is the ultimate goal and for Russia it is double commitment. Commitment as a member state of the NPT, and also commitment as a state depositary to the NPT together with the United States and the United Kingdom. So definitely April 1 statement, joint statement by presidents Obama and Medvedev about a world free of nuclear weapons was not a joke, it was a serious thing and a result of serious thinking in Moscow reflecting our own reading of threat perceptions and solutions for the future. And of course much work should be done on a very practical direction.

I will list… I would raise seven questions here on how we should proceed with much lower levels of nuclear weapons solutions for the NPT. And will make seven brief recommendations here. On the question side…First question: No doubt the road will be bumpy, but the question is what the speed of nuclear disarmament should be?. How quickly we should move? In that sense I would suggest the START Replacement Treaty is really -then we hopefully get it signed- a very initial step to re-energize Russian-US bilateral dialogue and also international spirit about nuclear disarmament, a very modest step indeed. Step by Step, but we should go to further areas reducing our nuclear weapon more dramatically
Having said that, whether we would be able to do in a short period of time, absolutely not. We already hear signs from the Capitol Hill that even that modest START Replacement Treaty would be unacceptable for some. As we know, in democratic societies Parliaments sometimes deter or stop the treaties from entering into force, and we certainly want first to see START replacement Treaty ratified and then go full speed to more dramatic or negotiations are more dramatic reductions including strategic and, at some point, also sub-strategic weapons.

Question number two: offensive vs. defensive, offensive plus defensive, how should it work? I am glad that this question for the current negotiation process is almost removed. Removed also with the decision of the US administration not to deploy elements of the missile defense in Europe, and in Central Europe and basically to re-do the missile defense plans. I think this is beneficial, this is a plus but the question would probably be in their list quite high when we will go to a more dramatic reduction.

Question number three, how should we deal with strategic weapons equipped with non nuclear elements?, non nuclear warheads if you like. New generation of high precision warheads, where some are much closer than others in obtaining this most sophisticated technology. For my country is a big and important question to be responded.

Question number four. Outer space related issues. So far, in contrast with very clear and important statements we hear from Washington on other issues, we haven’t heard that much about policy on preventing a weaponization of outer space. Russia and China have initiated the process in Geneva and tried to re-energize it on a multilateral level. I think this is an important issue which either can speed up our disarmament process or can block it at some point.

The next question, number five, is if we go bilaterally to nuclear reductions quite considerably, who would be finally invited to what they call “Nuclear Zero Party”? What is the list of the countries? And the first reaction would be everybody, but I think we really should look at it very carefully. Of course everybody should be finally involved by when, at what stage. At what stage should we will see France, United Kingdom, and China jumping in. How we should treat countries, members of the club but not members of the NPT. In that sense, my footnote would be that of course, we have a very special treatment of India. In contrast with many of my friends of the non-proliferation community, I believe this is right and I believe that India have got benefits, we all got benefits of how we treat India. At the same time India should deliver. India should really not get it for granted but should behave as if it were a member of the NPT and Nuclear Five within the NPT. It should really express its clear support to the CTBT, signing it and ratifying it as well as other relevant steps.

Question number six: I know Europe is a little bit far from that region but still. This is an important question for my country, how should we go to dramatically low levels of nuclear weapons under the current security architecture in Europe? or better say, how should we reform the whole security architecture in Europe from its transitional post Cold War timing to the current situation?. It would involve dialogue of new treaty for the European security, or may be more pragmatically instead of the treaties to have worked on new national conventional forces in Europe’s treaty.

And the final question I would raise, this is how should we address the public in countries with nuclear weapons? Because public basically likes nuclear weapons and at least in some of our countries with nuclear weapons. For instance, in my country, in Russia when I look at the statistics, 53% of the Russian population believes that today nuclear weapons play a critical role in providing for national security. 27% believe the role is not critical, not decisive but still important...only 3% of the Russian population believes nuclear weapons are a threat to Russian security and not the solution. It means, sometimes the government, administrations, the leaders should really take the lead, like in the issue of capital punishment, that they don’t necessarily have public support.
They should educate the public, we all should. In that sense I really appreciate the efforts which I noticed with the NPSGlobal in Argentina to educate on disarmament and nonproliferation. This has been the issue for the UN study on non proliferation and disarmament education and training chaired by Mexican Ambassador Marin Bosch a few years ago. We still haven’t done our job there yet. We still do it in a narrow sense. It is also a question why English prevails in most of that education efforts while we have other languages in the UN languages spoken like Chinese, Spanish or Russian with are underused for these education efforts.

And now I will just very briefly raise a few recommendations which should be done to fix the regime, to make improvements.

Number one: Reduce role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and nuclear security concepts. Important task, including for my own country.

Number two: Prevent appearance of new “de facto” nuclear weapons states. But while we are working on that we should probably base ourselves on understandings that there are not irrational players now. The players including those under suspicion are quite rational and they go nuclear or they open ways towards nuclear weapon avenues only if they really feel they need them for their national security not just to please themselves. And in that sense the further we work on reducing their security concerns, eliminating their security concerns, giving them security assurance, the better it would be to avoid having new nuclear weapon states “de facto”.

Next recommendation is related to the nuclear weapons states club of five, and maybe more. Not to increase numbers in nuclear weapons. For some, easy to say; for others, not necessarily. In my country I’d probably prefer before going to dramatically lower levels, first to see that nobody else would work on increase their arsenals.

Next recommendation would be to keep all the nuclear weapons within the national territories. Currently there is only one nation which keeps their nuclear weapons outside its national territory and this country is not Russia. I suggest that it miss the spirit of the NPT and should be put in either legally binding or in a clear declaratory format not to do so.

Next recommendation would be to change the list of priorities when we speak about proliferation concerns. Iran is definitely there. Still we have more clear and present dangers. We have countries with nuclear weapons which present danger for the stability of the whole regions. Israel here is number one and the lack of the implementation of the NPT decisions of the 1995 of the Middle East this may blow the success of the NPT Review Conference of 2010, and not disarmament or related issues. Pakistan. This is clearly a present danger for all of us: failing states with nuclear weapons. Unacceptable I think. United States, China, Russia, others should work together on meeting that threat very clearly and probably decisively.

Then, my penultimate recommendation would be working more on the engagement rather than on restrictions. In that sense, peaceful uses of nuclear energy: this is what we can and should promote together, without thinking of limitations and restrictions. I fully agree that multilateralizing of the nuclear fuel cycle is the solution for the future.

Let’s work currently on very practical steps in different levels, without restricting the national programs but cooperating. In that sense I can not forget about BRIC, with is a composition of countries: Brazil, India, China and Russia, which can and should work together on peaceful uses of nuclear energy as on of the corner stones on the BRIC agenda, and why not work on the issues of de-weaponization of the outer space. Why not working together on the peaceful uses on outer space? I think this is a common interest of our four nations. Three out of four can even make some important notion of that statement in
the upcoming NPT Review Conference. Certainly being in this region I have to say that my country, Russia, would like to work very closely - in the good meaning of the word- aggressively, in the nuclear markets of South America. The list is quite impressive: Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile where we can have this of that kind of development.

And my final point. And my final seventh recommendation. It would be short and the easiest ones because it would be about putting nuclear disarmament in the context of the military expenditure of the nations. We can not allow ourselves to work only on nuclear disarmament forgetting about other arms. Military budgets of certain nations are alarming, unacceptably huge. The financial crisis unfortunately didn’t give the lesson to reduce the budget of the military expenditure. I still believe nuclear zero issue can be put in the context only if all the leading nations work on the reduction of their military expenditure. Thank you very much.

Peter Hakim: -Vladimir, thank you very much. We will now turn to Rafael Grossi. But before I do. What we heard of three nuclear weapons states? I think what I’ve heard from the three nuclear is why is it going to be very difficult for any of the three nuclear weapons states here and probably say my own country as well to really engage in any kind of aggressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons. The recommendations are all much more modest and they don’t really get into the core of what the first panel was talking about: reducing nuclear weapons. It seems to be also pretty widespread consensus that countries that don’t have nuclear weapons now should not get them. The question is who do you bring to this together because the NPT addresses multiple. Absolutely.

Rafael Grossi: - Well, let’s see what we can do about it here. Thank you very much. It’s very nice to be here. As an Argentine I’m pretty much at home in Rio de Janeiro. Like you said I felt coming at this stage of the debate I had a double disadvantage. The first one is being the only one in the panel that doesn’t come from a nuclear weapons state and the second one is being the last obstacle before lunch. The first one is easier to solve because I don’t think I’ll have to explain why Argentina would need to have nuclear weapons. The second is easier I’ll be brief. But seriously what we heard very comprehensive, very solid presentation from the three world-class panelists. But this shows something, definitely, as the title of this panel puts it very rightly “moving from statements to facts”, might not be as easy as making those statements. But there’s something positive about statements.

First is that well, we do have them. We didn’t a few years ago a few weeks ago; maybe a few months ago the situation was rather different. In the sense that; to quote, I think, Rebecca Johnson was referring to the bargain, the basic proposition upon which the whole building of the NPT have been built, have been altered, I would say, quite dramatically. Because this very solid basic assumption that the “haves” disarm in good faith, the “have-nots” don’t cross the line, and then there’s peaceful nuclear energy for everyone. That basic bargain had been altered. And this has brought the whole system to disarray, and frustration, and confusion. I think the statements are statements, are words but are good that we have them. These are words that are trying to restore, I would say. Aiming at restoring that basic paradigm as it was said, also before. So in that sense I think we are in better position now. We assume that we are going to play by the rules and those that were supposed to do certain things are going to be doing just that. I mean, it is not President Obama who is committed to disarm, were those who sing the NPT on behalf of the United States.

Unfortunately we know that in the historical evolution certain things have lost priority, politically speaking, so to say. I think is good and we have to recognize that that is there and the basic equation, so to speak, is in the process of being restored and I think is also timely that we address this things now in the context of the upcoming review conferences. People are referring all the time to the failures. The failure in 2005 and we have a courageous Chairman here, Ambassador Duarte who was really deploying
efforts to save the day and he left a number of lessons after that exercise for all of us. But that failure was in a way the expression of fundamental problems we had.

The NPT Review conferences do not come in a vacuum, and they are useful in that they can’t act as a barometer, so to speak, of what's going on in the world in the area of nuclear security. We've had failures in the past. I was there in 1990. When we had I don’t know 4 am in Geneva under Peruvian chairmanship we had a big failure there. People don’t remember that in 1985 in Geneva it was saved by very little. So... Well, 1995 was good, 2000 was just there with these famous thirteen steps, and then 2005 was what we referred to. I’m making these references only to say that of course there is an underlined situation that puts limitations and conditions the action of diplomatic and negotiators there.

We stand the better chance, I wouldn’t put higher than that at this point. We stand the better chance of having a meaningful result and a meaningful document that could be something we, states parties, take home and say to ourselves not simply have achieved something, we have a road map, we have certain things we need to do from now on.

And I think we all know the menu. I think Resolution 1887 if nothing else and very useful in outlining all those issues where we need to move forward, with the exception of biological weapons unfortunately, with is not in that resolution and should have been included in some way or another because is serious threat and has not been attended to so far. And I’m hopeful people will pick this lost sheep and put it back in the basket of things we need to be working on in the future.

Statements from my previous speakers I think highlight how difficult this would be. There are no easy answers to many of the questions they are putting. These are legitimate question. We may not agree with everything’s been said, specially coming from a non nuclear weapons state who deliberately chose not to become one. So we have questions. We do put ourselves questions on this. We believe a serious, concerted effort must be made on the CTBT, on the Cut-off Treaty and certain things we need to be tackling in the next few months or years.

The issue of nuclear disarmament of course and coming from statements to facts might be easier to address from the stand point of the two big actors. Vladimir here in his double capacity as a scholar and negotiator, I think has explained it very well. And we will have to distinguished American speakers. Susan is there, she will tell us something about that, I’m sure. In their case the mesmerizing size of their arsenal makes the task easier. I’m not trying to simplify I know how difficult this political choices are. But still they are so far ahead the arms race has taken us to such stratospheric figures, I think President Obama has said that, cutting down and counting down, and cut downs would be a realistic thing to do.

But there are tougher cookies also that will have to be addressed. I think that Vladimir was mentioning those. What about the others? Nuclear disarmament is for all. I was glad to hear Prime Minister Brown saying that the UK is ready to be part in the exercise. He has been putting some interesting ideas on the table. On September 24th the Security Council was also encouraging to hear President Sarkozy saying that France would also. He was less generous in the details. Let’s hope that France would also assume its responsibilities and join those who have to cut on their arsenals. I think also the other nuclear weapon states will have to come to term with their responsibilities more traditional ones and the new ones also. Because I feel, again, what we need to respect the strategic situations and challenges that some of us may have at one point, we can not stand afloat in this process and we all need to take part in it. China, India, Pakistan, or any other country that may be holding nuclear weapons. This brings us to how to go about this. There are ideas of course. There also will be bilateral challenge, which would be more logical ones for the big actors. There might be a role for the multilateral avenue there. And I hope this will be explored. In a previous incarnation I was an international civil servant with the Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons in The Hague. A less sexy organization than the IAEA but far more
efficient, in that it has a better mandate, it has a disarmament mandate. We have people… I still say we. They have inspectors on 365 days a year basis in the Russian federation, in the United States, in India they used to have it, until India completed destruction of chemical arsenals. So disarmament in the area of weapons of mass destruction can be done multilaterally. Is not something you can say: “Let this for the big boys. Stay out of this.” The OPCW proves that you can have a multilateral inspectorate carrying out inspections with the full collaboration of member states, because that must be said, and deliver a product which is in a few years down the line a world free from one of the categories of weapons of mass destruction. So I think, and I hope there will be possibilities and here the imagination of politicians in nuclear weapons states will be essential and their political will also. But the raw material is there to have some multilateral intervention in this process on the basis of the IAEA, or any other basis. It’s something worth explore and I’m hopeful it would be done.

I said I would be brief, two more things. The first is the issue, and then again “from statements to facts” in a world where the phenomenon of terrorism is looming large. I think like our Indian colleague who said this is key. In a week from now we will start working in Washington to prepare the Nuclear Security Summit that would take place in April next year in Washington. Thirty seven nations plus the United States, the host nation, thirty eight countries will be working there on issues that need to be addressed. They have been addressed so far quite efficiently by the IAEA but we have to do much more in terms securing the nuclear materials and radioactive material. There’s a lot that can be done. Sometimes it’s failing to notice how weak we maybe in key areas that we could be use for our common disadvantages like non state actors.

Last point would be on this part of the world, on Latin America. And the role we can play in that process. We have done so in the past. Ambassador Gálvez from Mexico was reminding us of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which incidentally could have been the treaty of Itamaraty. Few know that in fact Brazil was the first country in 1962 that had an idea to have the complete denuclearization of Latin America. Unfortunately as in many other parts including my own country they had a military coup, the idea was abandoned, the Mexican wisdom picked it up then we have the Treaty of Tlatelolco, of we are so proud of these days. So in this region, back in the sixties we did something that was important because it showed the way to do business in this area and it was a watershed in terms of nuclear weapons free zones, which was replicated with diverse degrees of success in other parts of the world. Then in the nineties, I think Brazil and Argentina gave a wonderful example of how you can do things. Because, let’s be reminded that for these two countries like for other countries, South Africa is one case in point, it was a matter of decision.

To go nuclear or not to do it. And of course you may have those who may say that here the neighborhood was not justifying this or that. I can tell you in both countries we had a different library explaining exactly why we shouldn’t do that and we should take advantages of the relative situation we had. And we still recall with my Brazilian friends how difficult it was to negotiate, but we did it. And now we have a common agency, a common system. The reason I’m saying this is that the process needs to continue, not only elsewhere but also here.

In 2007 President Lula and President Cristina Kirchner decided that we needed to go for more and that was not enough what we had done. So we decided to start working in other areas for example in enrichment and other areas that had been so far out of the collaborating efforts that we had. And so we are doing this and we are thinking that we need to involve other countries in the region like Chile, Colombia, Mexico, other countries that also important actors in energy terms, in terms of climate change, so in other respects. So one can see that, and this would be the final message, none can stand at it. This is an exercise where we all have a state and it’s not only a matter for the “big boys” to address, if we want to have really a world which is safe and secure for all. Now we can go and have lunch. Thank you
Peter Hakim: -Thank you Rafael. I'm told that lunch is almost served so we only have short fifteen minutes for discussion but I want to suggest that we take a series question and then turn back the panel for one more round. And here we'll start with... tell us who you are.

Ramesh Thakur: -My name is Ramesh Thakur, I am Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada. And for this purpose I would like to identify myself as a former UN official with the rank of assistant of Secretary General. Resolution 1887 has been mentioned several times during the morning session and then in the second session. Paragraph four of Resolution 1887 reads: “calls upon all states that are not parties to the NPT to accede to the treaty as non nuclear weapon states”. I’d like to address my question primarily to Vladimir and Dingli Shen. Even they are not representatives of the government but it is the P-5 that negotiated this, although Ambassador Prakash may want to comment one this as he is part of the three countries which are the intended target of this. Do you believe this particular paragraph to be realistic, that Israel, India and Pakistan will sign the NPT as non nuclear states? If so, on what basis do you engage in that of the realism? If not, what does it says about the credibility of this Resolution and the credibility and authority of the Security Council?

Peter Hakim: -Thank you. I have one question for Rafael and then his answer might generate responses from the others. The way you describe, it’s almost like the NPT, and think I hear this reflected in others, is really an aspiration. Is really not a sort of serious limitation on countries? Brazil and Argentina they decided it on their own not to go nuclear. That’s another question: what going nuclear means?. Are we really talking about a treaty in the sense of a limitation? You sense that somehow the states with nuclear weapons feel any limitation, any restrain, any cost of action because of the NPT? or if it is simply an inspirational notion for the nuclear weapons states?. We'll going to take some more questions. Any other questions, the gentleman there with the microphone.

Member of the public: -My name is João Ricardo, I am a master in History of International Relations in the ORNEG, and I would like to ask a question to the table on a subject that is not directly related to the NPT, but it is linked to the matter of national defense in countries from South America. Right now there is a tendency to use weapons with fissile structure that are capable to attack all over the globe. For instance, China has now the capacity to attack any country of the world with a missile. The same thing goes for Russia, which has the same capacity, and Brasil, Argentina an all the countries from South America don't have nuclear power, don't own nuclear weapons. My question is the following: right now, China, Russia are acting in a more present way even in South America, in a way that led the United States to re-start their five fleet project, or that its directly linked to the increase of the Chinese commerce in the South of the Atlantic. My question is how should Brazil act in the presence of countries that discuss the terms of minimum capacity of persuasion in relation to the countries who don't have that kind of capacity of persuasion?. Thank you.

Peter Hakim: -Thank you. One more question and then we'll go back to... there is one, okay why don't we just go back, unless I am missing somebody. Rafael, why don't you just start-off and then we will go around the table?

Rafael Grossi: -Well, okay on your question?

Peter Hakim: -My question or any other one.

Rafael Grossi: -I think two things. The NPT, of course, it is as any other international instrument, it embodies an aspiration, and it has a legal obligation. The issue there is how this obligation is complied with, and we have seen that the record of course has been, I would say, moderate in terms of nuclear disarmament. But of course the presence of the NPT there … in balance has been a positive factor in the equation. Of course, that brings the question for states not do anything that would undermine it
because once you have a treaty if you undermine it by actions or omissions, of course others start asking themselves questions and say, “why should I limit myself or why did I sign into this club, if I see that this or that is happening?” By and large, to answer your question, it is a noble aspiration which needs to be complied, and compliance, as we’ve seen, it’s a very difficult proposition. So I put it like that.

**Dingli Shen:** Ramesh’s question seemed to be that countries think outside of the NPT whether they can join NPT as nuclear weapon states, if such likelihood is realistic. I feel that theoretically is possible. The reason why they develop is because they have security concerns. If they can change their security perception, to think differently, then it is possible. President Obama's history evoking speech, his leadership, and also whether he can continue to lead and to mobilize those NPT admitted nuclear weapons states or others nuclear weapon states to jointly, collaboratively disarm their nuclear weapons can help India and Pakistan and Israel’s security perceptions. They may not wait until the disarmament becomes completed by America to abandon their nuclear weapon program. They could have joined at a certain point. But certainly without the external synergy to make the external change of security environment, to induce India, Pakistan and Israel to feel the changes of security perception, such likelihood would be less possible.

**Peter Hakim:** -Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador...

**B.S. Prakash:** I think two of the three questions are related to the NPT and obviously I am not going to go there since we are not parties of the NPT. The third question was related to, just a comment about the third question, is about the regional or the global characteristics of the WMDs, particularly nuclear. I have a certain empathy, or sympathy with the question because I think that in today's world and with the technological and other kinds of reach that these weapons have -to talk of only regions, areas or even continents which would be immune from the danger, or to talk of the regional dimension- I think seems somewhat outdated technologically or otherwise. These weapons are global in nature and since the reach is global the solutions need to be global. Thank you.

**Vladimir Orlov:** -Thank you. I will limit myself to just responding Ramesh’s very good and very provocative question. The resolution of the UN Security Council is not provocative. It is just copy-paste of most obvious things, though it even contains some factual mistakes in the text. I think it is generally helpful and does not hurt to repeat what we already have in the NPT context for instance, what is called universality of the NPT and the NPT regime. However my personal reaction to that would be that, yes, it is possible but there are no universal solutions. Each solution for every state should be unique and actually there are three and a half states outside of the NPT and that half is DPRK, because differently reading the situation we may say that it withdrew from the Treaty or not completely withdrew from the Treaty. I think that it is possible to bring North Korea back to the NPT as a nuclear weapon state.

With Pakistan is a different issue but again I mentioned, is for me, Pakistan is a present and clear danger, not only from the NPT and non-proliferation standpoint but from the global security standpoint as a whole. Here we may see a very specific solution for the Pakistani issue, which if Pakistan does not cooperate may invoke external forces. With India it is certainly a very different case, and again, I suggest that we treat India as if it were a member of the NPT nuclear five but with the understanding that India also takes commitment as if it follows article six of the NPT.

And finally with Israel, the list is not as long, with Israel, I do believe that a next generation of Israeli politicians, unfortunately not this one, should come to a conclusion that for the survival of their state it is critically important to give up nuclear weapons. It’s not an option for them to build the zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. So, not today, not tomorrow, but I can see Israel in the Treaty following the example of South Africa and maybe some other. Thank you.
Peter Hakim: -Thank you. One last comment from Rafael very quickly.

Rafael Grossi: -To our Brazilian colleague who put a very interesting question with the South American-Latin American dimension. I think that he deserves a reaction from the table. I think he is putting a very timely question, a very serious one in the sense that we may in our part of the world start facing challenges and situations that call for our reaction, our response to those, in strategic terms. My very simple and very short reaction would be -and we could discuss this further if you want- that we need to do these things in consultation in the region thanks to a very important Brazilian initiative -Consejo Suramericano de Defensa - The South American Defense Council we now have an instance where we can for the first time in contemporary history cooperate and discuss those things. So, I believe that we are giving ourselves the tools to start addressing these things in consultation and in cooperation, to keep this continent a zone of peace.

Peter Hakim: -Thank you. Let me thank all of our distinguished panelists, and all of you for a very good session. Thank you.

Applause