Arms Control Association, Peter Crail, Daryl G. Kimball, Greg Thielmann, with comments by NPSGlobal, 9 Nov 2011.

Finally the IAEA published the awaited report on the situation in Iran. What were only suspicions a few days ago has become a reality adding a new element of instability to the region with the certainty that Ahmadinejad’s regime has some of the expertise needed to build nuclear weapons, should it decide to do so.

The suspicion that weighs on Iran is not new, but it was thought that big part of the developments had been stopped in 2003, turns out they had been on hold only.  The broad outline in the IAEA's latest report on the military dimensions of Iran's program is not new, but rather, provides greater detail regarding weapons-related activities outlined in previous public reports.

The activities documented in the IAEA report, including research related to nuclear warheads, underscore that Tehran's claims that it is only seeking the peaceful use of nuclear energy are false. The report suggests that Iran is working to shorten the timeframe to building the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.

The IAEA report is based largely on intelligence the United States and other IAEA member states. The U.S. intelligence community appears to stand by the judgment made in the 2007 NIE that Iran had a nuclear weapons program that was halted in the fall of 2003. Moreover, in his testimony before a Senate committee in March 2011, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed that the intelligence community still had a high level of confidence that Iran has not yet made a decision restart its nuclear weapons program.

Consistent with the finding of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, the IAEA report says that a comprehensive weapons program (known as the AMAD Plan) "was stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a 'halt order,'" in late 2003, but that some of the program's activities were resumed later. Key personnel are still involved in those renewed activities apparently tying up loose ends regarding their prior research and development work.

The main components of the iranian program include fissible material production, high explosives testing, warhead design verification and redesign work to develop warheads small enough to fit on the Shahab-3 missile.

Considering the IAEA's reliance on intelligence information from states, it went through considerable length to demonstrate why it thought this information was credible. Moreover, it seems some of the most incriminating evidence comes from the AQ Khan network, which Iran admits it relied upon. The information from the Khan network includes details about nuclear warhead designs the network gave Iran that match up to the research and experiments detailed in the intelligence information.

The report will be considered by the IAEA Board of Governors at its next meeting Nov. 17-18, along with a draft resolution censuring Iran for violating its nonproliferation commitments. The Board's 35 members cannot ignore Iran's warhead development activities or Tehran's refusal to cooperate with the IAEA's investigation into that work. It must also insist that Iran improve its cooperation with the agency prior to the next board meeting.

A consensus response is unlikely given existing divisions among the 35 countries, and in particular, Cuba's current membership on the board. Beijing and Moscow have also unfortunately played an unhelpful role prior to the release of the report by calling on Director-General Yukiya Amano to limit the information detailed it contains.

In response to the report, the White House has appropriately underscored that the United States continues to focus on using diplomatic channels to pressure Iran to abandon its sensitive nuclear activities.

The authors consider that continuing pressure through targeted sanctions against Iran's nuclear and missile sectors, coupled with the pursuit of a negotiated agreement to resolve serious concerns over Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and to limit its uranium enrichment capacity provides the best chance of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran.

On the other hand, military strikes against Iranian nuclear and military targets are considered unhelpful and counterproductive. Military strikes by the United States and/or Israel would only achieve a temporary delay in Iran's nuclear activities, convince Iran's leadership to openly pursue nuclear weapons, rally domestic support behind a corrupt regime, and would result in costly long-term consequences for U.S. and regional security and the U.S. and global economy.

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