Indian intelligence points to terrorists' interest in using lethal pathogens such as anthrax to carry out strikes against the South Asian state. In a U.S. diplomatic dispatch obtained by the antisecrecy group WikiLeaks, a high-ranking Indian official told the U.S. Embassy in India in 2006 that worries about biological warfare materials were "no longer" theoretical, as intelligence indicated terrorists were more avidly studying disease warfare.

Indian diplomat "Y.K. Singh reported that Indian intelligence is picking up chatter indicating jihadi groups are interested in bioterrorism, for example seeking out like-minded Ph.D.s in biology and biotechnology," according to an embassy dispatch to the United States.

"He compared the prospects for nuclear terrorism ('still in the realm of the imaginary') to bioterrorism ('an ideal weapon for terrorism ... anthrax could pose a serious problem ... it is no longer an academic exercise for us')," the document stated.

A separate diplomatic dispatch cautioned that "advances in the biotech sector and shifting terrorist tactics that focus on disrupting India's social cohesion and economic prosperity oblige the (government of India) to look at the possibility of terror groups using biological agents as weapons of mass destruction and economic and social disruption."

The cable said it would not be difficult for extremists to locate the ingredients needed for a biological attack in the nation and to use India as a launching pad for a global biological weapons strike.

"The plethora of indigenous highly pathogenic and virulent agents naturally occurring in India and the large Indian industrial base -- combined with weak controls -- also make India as much a source of bioterrorism material as a target," the cable said.

A biological attack initiated in India could cross international borders as "Delhi airport alone sees planes depart daily to numerous European, Asian, Middle Eastern and African destinations, as well as nonstop flights to Chicago and Newark" in the United States, the dispatch stated.

By using international air travel, " a witting or unwitting person could easily take hazardous materials into or out of the country," the embassy warned.

The official who wrote the dispatch said there was a low likelihood of a biological strike. However, the cable emphasized weaknesses in the Indian government's readiness for such an event. Indian officials' statements that the nation could protect itself from biological weapons were "unconvincing," the diplomat said.

Scientists affiliated with the U.S. diplomatic outpost in India had seen photographs from "frontline field laboratories for diagnostics of infectious diseases" that "demonstrated a host of poor laboratory security and safety practices, including families sleeping in labs and disposable gloves being washed for reuse or being disposed of as nonhazardous biological waste," according to the dispatch.

A specialist told U.S. envoys that "getting into a facility to obtain lethal bioagents is not very difficult here”. “The harsh reality is that you can bribe a guard with a pack of cigarettes to get inside," another expert reportedly said.

Ideological leanings or greed could lead some of the thousands of Indian biological researchers to ally themselves with extremists, envoys heard from one source.

India is not the only foreign nation whose biological safety controls have raised concerns. A U.S. delegation last month traveled to Africa to assess the security of local disease research laboratories in several nations. After concluding that the security measures at several laboratories were weak, the U.S. officials pledged to assist the facilities in enhancing their safeguards.

An anonymous Indian government official characterized the biological security issues addressed in the leaked 2006 cables as "far-fetched and fanciful."

Biotechnology specialist Suman Sahai confirmed to the AP, though, that Indian biotechnology companies continue today to have weak laboratory biosecurity measures.

There are many holes in Indian regulations, it is not difficult to sway biotechnology personnel, and employees departing government laboratories for the private sector frequently take genetic substances and other sensitive material with them, Sahai said.

Nonetheless, a dispatch indicates strongly that Indian authorities' attention in 2006 was on a chemical or nuclear strike -- anticipated to originate from neighboring antagonist Pakistan -- rather than a biological attack.

Back