
Des Browne: Thank you very much for those kind words of introduction and the excellence of distinguished guests, fellows and many friends in this room. It is a real pleasure to be here and I want to start first of all by thanking you, Irma and the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network for inviting me to, not just to Buenos Aires and this is the first time I have ever been here, but also to address this tremendous audience of policy makers, diplomats, students, members of the military and others who have gathered to focus on the nuclear policy issues as important to global security. Let me say Irma, it is clear from their presences in this room you have a stellar work on these complex issues. The fact of you’ve gathered and put together to this Seminar and hosting tomorrow meeting of global leaders is testimony of your great energy and dedication and I salute you for it. I know we across the world appreciate the work you have done to make the world safer, today and for future generations.

The topics that we are addressing over these days and into this Seminar from the future of non-proliferation and disarmament to the role of global and regional tensions clearly present significant challenges. And unfortunately these challenges feel particularly acute today and sadly from a European perspective. The truth is that we are at a very precarious moment on all nuclear security fronts, as we heard already this morning from the P5 process and the upcoming Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference are not encouraging.

The incremental approach to disarmament to the bargain that recognizes nuclear weapons states – the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, China and France – started over forty five years ago, and now it is so painful slow that often feels as if we are moving backwards and not forwards. And it is difficult to see a path forward when the five nuclear weapons states cannot agree among themselves about how to proceed and the non-nuclear weapons states are, and I do not use my words over this, angry about the pace of progress to world disarmament. Meanwhile, we have states expanding their nuclear arsenals, surreptitiously seeking nuclear weapons under the disguise of civil energy program and detonating nuclear test devices in the face of international condemnation. Finding a productive course respect to
Iran and North Korea is a particularly difficult challenge. We did see the approval of the New Start Treaty between the United States and Russia on 2010, it was an important achievement for global security, but additional reductions are needed and the prospects for talks on that front are dump at the very best, indeed. And expectations that the United States and Russia will talk about anything, the prospects for that are dump at the moment.

The chilling effects of recent events in Ukraine make our agenda today is in danger of being put into deep freeze. And we shared the situation not only strange isolation between Russia and the United States, may I say that it is proving to do, so far, some to boost the arguments of those who oppose reducing the roles of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security construct.

Decades after moment when more than two thousands nuclear tests were conducted worldwide leaving a ghastly humanitarian and environmental legacy amid ruin conscience over the proliferation of nuclear weapons, efforts to ratify the ban of nuclear tests has stopped. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was adopted and opened for signatures in 1996 as a key piece of global nuclear security architecture, and since then one hundred and eighty three countries have signed the Treaty and one hundred and sixty two have ratified it. But in the United States the process has been blocked in the U.S. Congress. And is blocked as well already including in China, importantly, which would not ratify until and unless the U.S. does.

I must state one more problem to the last although I could say many more. And that is that all the nuclear weapons states today are working for modernizing their arsenals. It performs an unfortunate message about the lack of enthusiasm on arms control. Over the next three decades, the United States alone is expected to spend a staggering one trillion dollars on modernizing and maintaining its nuclear arsenal. But we must not allow this negative steer of fears to drain, or resolve, or to discourage walking on this critical issues. A missing spot on today, but it is important to remember is that we will not always be in this moment.

As the situation in Ukraine has demonstrated too clearly the global security landscape can change unexpectedly and almost overnight. Unfortunately history has shown us that it can change some times for the better, we cannot minimize toward the day that would change the favorable work and the work predicated by the NPT. So, as we will continue to press ahead, I think we can only take some solace in the action proffered by my good friend, Lassina Zerbo, the very head of the CTBTO, who said: “it is a well-known fact that frustration often paves the way for innovation.” So perhaps, the best course of action is, in the words of my colleague Dr. Ian Kearns, the director of the European Leadership Network, “to address the issues that are in front of us.”

Here is what I believe we need to do, we must firstly avoid the unintended escalation of the situation in Ukraine and we must manage the confrontation effectively and responsibly, its destabilizing events confronting it with the EU approach, to Euro-Atlantic security which was the subject of the 2014 report Building Mutual Security in Euro-Atlantic region. A process I have the privilege of co-chairing with former senator Sam Nunn, former Russian Minister Igor Ivanov and the German former Deputy Foreign Minister Wolfgang Ischinger, who is the well-known leader of the Munich Security Conference. Written before the Crisis in Ukraine erupted it contains medium and long term solution that we still believe can contribute to the solution for the region, solutions that will improve security globally and it would be reenergizing the presentation of that report over the coming months. We must do everything we can to get a
deal done with Iran. The very least, an agreement to continue the dialogue maintaining the status quo, and I mean the status quo now.

And in the event of a deal, we must ensure that the US Congress approves the necessary sanctions relief measures. We must turn the humanitarian impact initiative, a set of global conferences on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, into a shared enterprise across nuclear “haves” and “have nots” rather than a new point of division. I mean, we must do this by focusing on preventing the worst, not only through disarmament but by de-alerting, by securing materials, by universalizing the Additional Protocol, and by ramping up considerably effective preparations to handle an incident should one happen. And we must not forget of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. We need a more open and honest discussion on how most effectively we ensure European security, with capabilities that are actually usable. I am optimistic about the possibilities for progress and you should be too, because there are a number of inevitable ideas out there about how to tackle many of these issues and disagree that the inevitable will be going on.

Let me begin with the P5 process. As a 2015 NPT Review Conference approaches one question many of us have considered is how to revitalize the process itself. Well, transparency is the key. I believe we need to open it up and make it more accountable. When we do that, maybe to hold a session at the Review Conference for example, during which nuclear weapons states collectively acquiesce by non-nuclear weapons states on the progress of disarmament and the challenges that they face. These discussions could need to propose about what both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states could do to facilitate it. A successful 2015 NPT Review Conference also requires some countries to take serious steps before the Conference convenes, but they have to act fast. Among them is proposed by the European Leadership Network in a recent statement. Russia and the United States and UK, the three NPT depository states, should issue a statement jointly, with the UN Secretary General, informing they will want to work setting up a Conference on the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East.

Nuclear weapons states should agree to be more transparent and demonstrate greater commitment to the global disarmament. All nuclear weapons states should participate in, and then help shape the agenda, on the Third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons which is now set to take place on the next month in Austria.

I have noted a very positive development the United States announced, just last week or the week before that would attend to the Conference on the issue for the first time. The other nuclear weapons states should follow suit. Finally the United States and Russia should reassert their willingness to maintain in nuclear arms control and disarmament dialogs, despite current tension in their relationship.

Prompt launch posture of the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces maybe an area right for progress too. A quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War each country still deploys hundreds of long range ballistic missiles, land and sea based, with roughly two thousand nuclear warheads promptly set to destroy each other, capable of being fired within minutes. Each maintains large nuclear forces on state of alert, ready for launch, and capable of hitting the targets in less than 40 minutes. This lunch-on-warning posture is said to ensure, but that can be an advantage for a fast strike but it is also calculated to lead to an inevitable mistake. Well here in this posture is a risk of accidental or unauthorized launch by either side, as well as a risk a deliberate decision to use ballistic missiles would be need in haste on the basis of faulty
or incomplete data. What is more, the risks exposed by these forces are increasing as cyber-threats and nuclear missile capabilities proliferate in other countries. What can be done? Ultimately the U.S. and Russia could agree to reciprocal steps to reduce dangers by changing it on their force postures.

This could be taken as part of a future process to repair the bridge open between the West and Russia over the Ukraine. And in the meantime, other governments and NGOs must work to increase awareness about this today and keep the issue visible by governments and publics. We need to make it possible for Moscow and Washington to see the political and diplomatic benefits in addition to the security benefits of acting on this issue. A merit that underscores to countries that may be considering adopting such force postures in the future, that they will decrease security and will have no support by international community.

As for the CTBT, we are long way away from 1996 when its adoption represented the high water mark for multilateralism. There is no question we have made progress since then, and the Treaty has established a “de-facto” global moratorium on testing. But we need to get the job done. And I am confident we can do it with a concerted and coordinated effort by governments, civil society and the scientific international community who are a significant component element to this. Today the CTBTO group of eminent persons, senior stages politicians and experts, is pressing in the case of leaders in capital of states that have not ratified. All of us can do more. There are answers to arguments against ratification including that verification and monitoring would not work. We already have state of the art verification systems in place and important improvements hides have been made to give a very solid answers to the CTBT critics we must dedicate ourselves to providing them and demanding action. And I would mention the scientific contribution for this leadership.

These are just a few ideas to move forward. And at the Nuclear Threat Initiative we have to engage governments and experts from around the world to walk with us on any kind of project, on issues from verification to nuclear material security. And on the issue of 85% we only yesterday launched a military materials study group to graph some of the challenges in relation to that, I am sure that my colleague the President Joan Rohlfing will talk in more detail this afternoon. We believe this kind of engagement is important because when it comes of nuclear security, global challenges require global solutions.

Thank you for inviting me to be with you today. I look forward now to further engagement of some here by hearing ideas you may have about ways to make progress on these challenging issues.

I do say that from the perspective of a European, the Latin American, the South American voice on these issues is extremely important. As has already been said this is a whole continent for which there are no upsides to nuclear weapons, no strategic security, only risks. This voice needs to be heard much more strongly in the debates across the world as it is a unique voice. So thank you for the opportunity of engage with you, and after saying it looking in this room I am optimist, I am working this field thinking that it won’t be impossible, with a steady optimism about the possibility for progress. The interest and dedication of those who are here today gives me yet a more cause for that optimism. Thank you very much.