Emiliano Buis: Bueno, vamos a dar lugar entonces al primer panel. Invitamos a los expositores y al moderador del primer panel a que por favor se acerquen al estrado.

El panel número 1 se va a referir al contexto de la seguridad internacional y al incremento de los riesgos nucleares. Esencialmente la idea del panel es analizar las tensiones, tanto globales como regionales, que pueden incrementar la proliferación y por supuesto, obstaculizar los esfuerzos de desarme.

El primer panel va a estar moderado por Rafael Grossi. Rafael Grossi es embajador argentino ante el gobierno de Austria, representante permanente ante los organismos internacionales con sede en Viena y actual presidente del Grupo de Proveedores Nucleares. Entre sus múltiples actividades orientadas al desarme y la no-proliferación en particular destacamos que ha sido Jefe de Gabinete del Director General del Organismo Internacional para la Prohibición de Armas Químicas (OPAC) y Jefe de Gabinete en el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (OIEA).

El Embajador Rolf Ekéus, es Presidente emérito de la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Investigación para la Paz Internacional de Estocolmo (SIPRI) y miembro de la Red de Líderes de Europa. Ha sido Presidente Ejecutivo de la Comisión Especial de Naciones Unidas sobre Irak y actualmente es miembro de la Junta Directiva de Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Jorge Castro es analista de política internacional. Es Presidente del Instituto de Planeamiento Estratégico y ha tenido una activa participación periodística. Además, por más de 20 años ha sido profesor en diversas universidades nacionales.

Finalmente, Ramesh Thakur, es Director del Centro para la No Proliferación y el Desarme Nuclear, de la Crawford School de la Australian National University y profesor adjunto en el Instituto de Ética, Gobernanza y Leyes de la Universidad Griffith. Ha sido Vice-Rector de la Universidad de las Naciones Unidas y ha sido consultor de diversos gobiernos y director fundador del Balsillie School of International Affairs, en Waterloo, Canada.

Adelante, muchas gracias.

Rafael Grossi: Bueno, buenos días a todos. Es un gran placer and a great honor to be here. I will speak in English, I am sure that we have here excellent translation facilities and interpretation and I feel it is better for my co-panelists, so that we can have a direct
communication without the problems and the time like for interpretation in between. We do have excellent professionals there, and a distinguished audience that, I am sure, will not have any problem with this... Well...first of all – as I will say – as I was saying briefly in Spanish, when I started – It is great to be here, I want to comment here, I want to commend Irma Argüello in particular, NPSGlobal as well as the Latin American Network of Leaders for their hospitality and the initiative to bring this kind of debate to this part of the world. It is not usual or common to have such quality gathering of expertise and talent around the table on this type of global issue. It is very necessary as it is obvious for all of us and for all of you that these problems recognize a global dimension, as Irma was just recalling us in her introductory words. So, it is very important to be here and we are very happy and I am very proud to be part of this with you.

Our panel is the one that – I suppose – should try to provide some framework for the discussions that are going to follow, since here we are going to try to draw the general context in terms of international security and nuclear risks that are going to be discussed more in detail by the subsequent speakers.

What I, as introducer for this discussion, would - may be - like to propose is that in looking into the problems, the situations, the crisis that are present in the international scene at the moment, since we are looking at the nuclear risks -inherent or not to them- that we look precisely into the nuclear factor that may be present, as absent, as an added factor, as an aggravating factor, as a lateral factor, or as a central factor of each one of these problems.

If we look at the international scene as such, we will see that the nuclear element there, is present in some of them and is not in some others. In some others as I said, it aggravates the whole thing and for others is “the thing.” In other cases, the nuclear thing is the problem, in others as I was... I am trying to say is a lateral factor. When you look into, for example, into the problems in the African continent, when you look into the Sub Saharan crisis you will not immediately recognize a nuclear element, although it might have been present or relevant in the past – in the case of South Africa, for example, it is no longer there in most of the cases.

When you look into the Northern part of Africa, in particular to those countries that can also be recognized as being part of the Middle East, or the Middle Eastern problematic as such, then you start to recognize the looming spectrum of the nuclear thing. But by large the issue is not there.

The situation is different when you look into the Euro-Asian dimension, and in these days, of course, and in our program we see that there is a concrete mention of the Ukraine crisis or the deteriorating situation in terms of - or apparently deteriorating situation - when it comes to the U.S. or the West relation with Russia. There, the nuclear thing has a very central role, including in cases like Ukraine – a country that does not have nuclear weapons but also in relation with the recent, more recent crisis of Crimea, where you do have, for example, nuclear facilities that used to be safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency and now have changed of hands, so to speak, so there are there some very relevant nuclear elements that we may wish to look at.

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When you move, of course, to the Asian sub-continent the issue is clear, we do have countries that have now nuclear weapons in a sub-regional context that it is frequently tense, so there the nuclear matter plays a role. Is this the central role? Is this an aggravating factor to an underlying preceding crisis? This is a matter to be, of course, discussed.

When you look into a problem that is very dear to my heart because I worked many-many years in it, like Iran, there I would propose that the nuclear is the issue, the nuclear thing is the problem, but perhaps there are other issues connected to that, but clearly and these days we are coming to the closing phase of a cycle, there will be another cycle of negotiations of course with Iran, but the current cycle, apparently, is going to come to an end on November 24th, and as we speak there is a final round of negotiations taking place in Vienna looking into that. So there the nuclear matter is the issue.

So, if you look further away in Asia you will see that the nuclear question is also present in China and Japan, in different forms, shapes and sizes. Coming closer to home, I would also like to mention that in Latin America where we have been able to deal with nuclear matters in a constructive, cooperative way through Tlatelolco, and in the case of the Southern Cone Argentina and Brazil (ABACC), and the complete renunciation of an arms race: We do have concerns in this country, in Argentina, about the possible presence of nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic. So, is this issue a big danger or not, is it a problem or not? But clearly an issue that needs to be looked at.

So, these bird’s eye introduction shows us that the nuclear risks and the increasing presence of the nuclear factor is something that cannot be overlooked, and that affects in different forms and in different ways the problems that we have in front of us, in the international scene.

Thus making them more urgent to be solved, and to be solved in different ways, using different diplomatic tools. And this is what we are going to try to discern, we are going to try to learn through the informed, the wise look of my co-panelists.

So these are my introductory remarks and hoping that these may help in making the discussion a bit more interesting. And not further we would to start introducing my co-panelists, starting with Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, he has already been introduced so like I said, I will not delay you further from his start. Rolf, please, you have the floor, and welcome to Buenos Aires.

**Rolf Ekéus:** Thank you very much Rafael and Irma thank you very much for inviting me. I am very honored to be here, and very happy to be here! I think the issues we are addressing today and our panel especially will be broader and more general than we focus, may be, on details.

My responsibility, I guess, will be to take start at least, from what we in the Northern Europe feel the European crisis. Suddenly the peace for Europe appears to bring in out problems and concerns to all of us on the global basis, I will return to that. But, if I may say so, the Crimea annexation was a starting point and as you pointed out, Rafael, it has a clear nuclear dimension, namely at it was one of these – so said - legal dimensions safeguarding the Crimean and Ukrainian identity. There was the Budapest Memorandum, which in its turn had its base in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Memorandum stated that the nuclear capabilities
and components in Ukraine should be taken out of the country, moved to Russia, but also that should be components of assurances by the participants in this Memorandum, which of course was signed up by depository powers of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

So because of the annexation of Crimea obviously looked rather following to the United Nations Charter, but it looked peculiar to the Helsinki document and to the Paris document on the future of Europe. So it violates many things, I can tell you, it was not one of relaxed peace in Europe, and let me say that in the North this came as a shock in the Northern part of Europe. And let me say the three Baltic states once having been part of the Soviet Union, felt an acute sense of concern, and oddly enough also the peaceful little countries like Sweden sensed a tremendous pressure and it affected the policy. The Baltic states immediately started being members of NATO. They required increasing presence, or increasing the expansion of NATO presence in these three Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their territories. Sweden which had the policy of several years of quiet, peaceful making its defense technical, start changed to policy and immediately started to build its military budget, expanding its combat aircrafts capabilities. It is expanding its submarine, its high quality submarine forces.

So, it shows the shock consequences, but of course, that was military - - I would say – NATO, troops, weapons, but of course it is more important to me is the diplomacy. And what is the diplomacy? Well, it must be possible to penetrate, understand not in a positive the Russian thinking, I understand, comprehend may be Russian cause I do not feel to need to like it, an understanding of the action, but you need to penetrate the thinking of Moscow’s Putin as a policy against the West, and obviously the driving force is the nationalism and pride rooted not in Stalinist Soviet Union but in the Imperial Russia shaped by the Czar Peter, the founder of St Petersburg, Putin’s birth place, if I may add. To that one must add the Russian orthodoxies are having a considerable influence and strengthen its activities and the church is growing its influence in the nationalist agenda.

Of course we must be aware that Putin’s priority is now to keep a control of the powers inside the country. Thus, when two years ago, I was myself there, to see - so to say - protest activities to take place in the center of Moscow, Putin moved as a response by increasing conflict and tensions with the West, mobilizing the sense of nationality, and pride and that also have quiet an effected impact on the East national opponents. So he succeeded in that sense, strengthening his position by taking a tough anti-Western line. Also when Putin replaced Medvedev as Russia’s President he took very quick steps to diminish or rather freeze the NATO-Russia Council – a body which had been for several years been managing to balance security situation in the European arena, and a - so to say - security dialogue with the United States - so say - came to an end. The, of course like many others like the church, like its compatriots Putin ceased the inspection of the West European Continent as manifest in the series of steps first of all with the NATO enlargement added to further isolation, further diminishing the role of Russia in the world.

So these actions, that is, why he is reacting on the Ukrainian initiatives. States like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, constitute important elements for the European Union, the European policy is a matter of what we call Eastern neighborhood. But you have seen that its expansion firstly inviting these countries into a socialization agreement to be followed by a security
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discussion, to be followed in the end by a membership of NATO, at least that is what Russia suspects with regards to Moldova, Ukraine and of course, Georgia. So, that creates a sense of isolation and diminution of Russia.

I cannot say personally that I admire diplomacy of the European Union during the last few years, it has been well in turns but it has impressed in a way which it is total absence of a dialogue with Russia when it developed its - so to say - Eastern partnership, its pathetic lack of diplomacy. So then, what should be done beneath a diplomatic project? Of course the Ukrainian people having free and fair elections expressed their wish for an opening towards EU and the West. This of course, this is democracy, this should be respected by the West, both U.S. and the European Union, should - at least – form the policy with that respect, but at the same time, do something which they had forgotten, namely engage with Russia, diplomatically.

A first step – and I will give you as a few steps – would be of course to activate, revitalize the NATO-Russia Council. It would be good, but let me say it is not enough. We must bear there that a more constructive inter-dialogue cannot in the long run be channeled exclusively through NATO, where the military security philosophy is the dominating culture. A central policy of the West, of course, should also be careful and reviewed. I must say that travel restrictions for individual businessmen should be not pursued in the way it is done. Of course, it came in cases: yes, but in other cases changes should be linked to clear conditions for the lifting.

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I spent part of my life I must say, in the organization to security cooperation in Europe and that has been clearly a side-line. I had a conversation with a fellow Minister Lavrov and I complained, I must say, why you do not use or receive or you have a very strong position and the fool said, “is that, no-no-no my friend, in a way you see we had one to thirty three states votes, but in NATO-Russia Council that is we have half of the votes. Well, you know I think regret that statement, but I think and I also hope that both the West and the Russians move towards activate oversee why, because it addresses practically all these issues which are problematic in Europe. The minority-majority relations, human rights, election rights, election processes could address effectively the Vienna documents for military confidence security building measures should of course, be activated now, well and further steps should be taken for military to military contexts. This has been missing totally, and of course another diplomatic movement - of course – must be about the G8 talks, they should be restored as G8, and not now as a G7, with Putin excluded with a overdressing the global economic structure. I can assure you, I do not think Putin is very nice, I think he is – however – a very important actor. And it is naive to try to run international politics without taking it into account that is my final area, namely, why it is so important to deal with this issue in the global sense. I would call it global security agenda.

First of all, the strategic nuclear weapons U.S.-Russia talks must be kept alive. The new START was a success. Some say, well the numbers were not that much in the cut. But as a recall what the new START said was a functioning well-designed system force stability, control and verification of strategic weapons. And that – of course – should be told. You may not be interested in this but I name of course is European tactical nuclear weapons on the European
agenda, should be – might be - taken out. any of the European countries only favored, but this is a matter that takes highly components – and obviously – the NPT is only mentioned.

Now, of course, I may be glad you mentioned the uranium situation. Of course the uranium nuclear program is important and then everyone has to assist, not the least Russians. Russians are key actors in these talks, because they are the ones who should take care of the enriched uranium as another sensitive material in the hopeful ideal it would be heard on the 24th November, of course, I guess there is a lot of skeptics in this room, but let us keep our hope for the 24th November.

But then, what is now coming up was the whole, if I say, the world is a matter of the Islamic fundamentalist, the ISIS action. For Russia it is the Islamic South where the fundamentalism is growing with tremendous speed, which should all, I think it is important to start to make it an important component in the global security agenda must be the dealing with the new challenges of fundamentalist Islamists. Of course, other issue where Russians are essential for the West cooperation is actually the matter of the chemical weapons. I think that it was an elegant diplomacy, sometimes you can be happy to be diplomats – I think so – in such smart way, and the final, so to say, action here, is of course, the matter of – may be - the most important to bring a dialogue with China into play. I am not a great admirer of Richard Nixon, I must say. But the way he handled the so Brezhnev, and the way he handled Mao and the play then was a masterstroke. Then it was not good for all of us to start to see if he can get these actors together. So that is, I think, the common global agenda we have to address, I mean, there are other issues, but that is starting from Crimea. Thank you very much.

Rafael Grossi: Thank you very much. Thank you very much Rolf for succeeding in encapsulating so much in these few minutes you had. Of course, you were part of many of the processes that you were mentioning, so I am sure that when we come back to you in the questions and answers, part of our debate, you will have more to contribute. So my idea would be to simply continue, to have our panelists offer their thoughts, and then, in the end, I am sure we will have a very rich exchange with them.

So, I move on to my co-national Dr. Jorge Castro, one of the main political analysts and thinkers on international relations, security, and also national politics - a very distinguished man of thought. We are very happy to have an Argentine view around the table I will pass on the floor to you, Dr. Castro. So he is taking the podium.

Jorge Castro: Agradezco a la Fundación NPSGlobal, en especial a la Dra. Irma Argüello, que me ha permitido participar de este importante seminario internacional. Agradezco doblemente por permitirme hacerlo como integrante de este prestigioso panel.

En Medio Oriente, en la zona del Levante Árabe, constituida por Siria, Irak, Líbano - la región más estratégica del planeta - se ha desencadenado en los últimos seis meses el más poderoso desafío desintegrador del sistema mundial en esta parte del siglo. Con la libertad de acción en este conflicto que ha estallado en manos de un islamismo revolucionario, de proyección global y praxis bélica de avanzada, de carácter técnico, no religioso. El Estado Islámico, o ISIS, que se ha desatado esta extraordinaria ofensiva en la región más estratégica del planeta es el actor
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que encarna una de las partes más significativas de este enfrentamiento de alcance global. ISIS, o Estado Islámico, es la expresión contemporánea del islamismo revolucionario surgido de la explosión geopolítica ocasionada por la revolución islámica de Irán liderada por el Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini al derrocar en 1979 al Shah Reza Pahlavi. Esta corriente se ha templado luego en el combate durante los diez años de enfrentamiento al Ejército Rojo en Afganistán que transcurrieron entre 1981 y 1989. Luego ha sido el actor fundamental de los diez años de ofensiva fundada en el terror contra los Estados Unidos, liderada por Osama Bin Laden y que ocasionó el derrumbe de los edificios gemelos de Manhattan en el año 2001.

Por último, esta corriente revolucionaria ha sido un protagonista fundamental de los tres años de guerra civil en Siria que se despliegan desde el año 2011 hasta este año 2014. Ahora, lo que ha sucedido, es que este conflicto ocasionado fundamentalmente por el derrumbe de las estructuras territoriales estatales del Estado del Levante Árabe, creadas estas estructuras territoriales estatales por el acuerdo entre franceses y británicos que tuvo lugar en 1916, en el transcurso de la Primera Guerra Mundial a través del acuerdo Sykes-Picot. Son estos estados los que se han derrumbado como consecuencia directa del hecho de que llegó a esta región, de extraordinaria importancia estratégica, el fenómeno del proceso insurreccional de la sociedad civil del mundo árabe denominado “Primavera Árabe” que se despliega desde hace cuatro años, ocasionada por el comienzo de este proceso histórico fundamental, en Túnez, el día 17 de diciembre de 2010. Lo que ha sucedido en ocasión de este fenómeno fundamental, del proceso insurreccional de la sociedad civil del mundo árabe, que comenzó en Túnez, ha sido la quiebra en forma irreversible en todas partes al mismo tiempo, del status quo político, económico y social.

El colapso territorial-estatal ocurrido en el Levante Árabe, ha provocado un gigantesco vacío geopolítico en esta región en donde se encuentran las reservas, más de dos tercios de las reservas petroleras y gasíferas del sistema mundial. En esta región, este inmenso vacío geopolítico es lo que le otorga la extraordinaria letalidad en términos bélicos, que está demostrando la Organización del Islamismo Revolucionario o Estado Islámico, en una ecuación que tiene un sentido nítido de continuidad, el derrumbe de las estructuras territoriales estatales del Levante Árabe, la que ha provocado este inmenso vacío geopolítico y como consecuencia de él es que ha emergido la extraordinaria letalidad bélica del Islamismo Revolucionario en la región más estratégica del planeta.

Este conflicto se ha transformado en los últimos seis meses en el mayor conflicto del sistema mundial de la segunda década del siglo XXI. Y como consecuencia, ha provocado un completo realineamiento de fuerzas en esta región. La consecuencia de este completo realineamiento de fuerzas es que se ha establecido en la región del Levante Árabe, el núcleo del Medio Oriente, una nueva relación amigo-enemigo, lo que afecta fundamentalmente las negociaciones que tienen lugar en este momento, en este fin de semana, en Omán sobre el Golfo Pérsico entre la República Islámica de Irán y los seis países que representan a la comunidad internacional que están negociando un acuerdo sobre el programa nuclear iraní. Lo que ha ocurrido con motivo de la irrupción de este conflicto de alcance global, es que se ha establecido una nueva relación de fuerzas en esta región y por lo tanto ahora, los que habían sido los principales adversarios estratégicos sobre el conflicto iraní, en materia nuclear (Estados Unidos y la República Islámica de Irán) se han convertido frente al desafío del islamismo revolucionario, surgido en el Levante
Árabe, en verdaderos aliados estratégicos. Este es un elemento de extrema importancia para percibir el cambio de la relación de fuerzas en la región, y por lo tanto permite establecer un diagnóstico de otro tipo sobre las consecuencias de lo que todo indica que puede ser un probable acuerdo nuclear entre Estados Unidos e Irán además de los otros seis países que integran la comunidad internacional y que están hoy negociando en Omán.

En este sentido, la cuestión ahora en esta región de Medio Oriente antes que un conflicto de carácter esencialmente militar es un desafío de orden básicamente político porque el vacío de poder que ha surgido en esta región, hace que lo que le otorga especial eficacia bélica al islamismo revolucionario del Estado Islámico no sea su capacidad militar en sí misma, sino precisamente el hecho de que se sustenta en el derrumbe de las organizaciones territoriales estatales de esta región – la más estratégica del planeta.

Por eso es que hay que advertir que este conflicto tiene una naturaleza específica, surgida de sus condiciones, de las condiciones que le han dado origen. Se trata de un conflicto sin límites, ni objetivos temporales, es una guerra de duración prolongada por definición y por su naturaleza que tiene lugar a 100 km del Mediterráneo. En una región donde están situadas a 300 km de los lugares donde hoy se está combatiendo, están situadas más de dos tercios de las reservas mundiales de petróleo. Por eso, es que, lo que conviene subrayar es que el derrumbe de las organizaciones territoriales estatales del Levante Árabe ha tenido como consecuencia y subproducto la virtual desintegración de sus estructuras militares. Ante todo la desintegración del estado Iraquí y de su ejército. El ejército de Irak es el cuarto ejército en orden de importancia de Medio Oriente, y este ejército se ha desintegrado en términos institucionales y también, por lo tanto, como consecuencia, en lo que hace a su eficacia bélica.

El punto de inflexión del conflicto en los últimos seis meses ha sido la captura por ISIS, islamismo militante, de la ciudad de Mosul, la segunda ciudad iraquí después de la capital Bagdad. Esa ciudad fue tomada, Mosul, en tres días de combate por una columna de ISIS de tres mil combatientes, que enfrentaron a esa guarnición que defendía, supuestamente, la ciudad de Mosul por tres divisiones del ejército iraquí: más cuarenta mil hombres. Esos cuarenta mil hombres no ofrecieron ni siquiera un esbozo de resistencia de manera efectiva frente a la ofensiva de ISIS, islamismo revolucionario. Por eso es que la guerra ha adquirido este carácter donde lo que está en juego ahora, y este es el objetivo notorio de la organización del islamismo revolucionario, lo que está en juego ahora es la defensa o la captura de Bagdad, la capital iraquí, la cual se encuentra virtualmente rodeada por el islamismo revolucionario y en la que el ejército iraquí se ha mostrado incapaz de defender incluso bastiones militares ubicados a quince, veinte kilómetros del centro de Bagdad. La cuestión en términos estratégicos es cómo enfrentar este desafío de carácter extraordinario, en donde su letalidad surge no tanto de su eficacia bélica, sino del hecho de que actúa en un inmenso vacío geopolítico.

La clave es la contención del islamismo revolucionario en sus límites actuales, quebrando su iniciativa y el punto central en este aspecto decisivo, que todo lo decide, es impedir que se apodere de Bagdad, en cuya defensa pueden jugar un papel esencial, como ya está ocurriendo, tanto las fuerzas de los Estados Unidos, fuerzas especiales norteamericanas, además de su fuerza aérea, también pueden cumplir o están cumpliendo un papel esencial las milicias...
chiitas, por un lado y las fuerzas Quds, tropas de elite especializadas de la República Islámica de Irán, que están actuando en concierto y acuerdo con las fuerzas especiales norteamericanas. En siete días de septiembre Saqlawiyah, la base militar iraquí situada a veintiocho kilómetros de Bagdad, fue sitiada por el islamismo revolucionario.

De pronto, al amanecer del domingo 21 de septiembre, se presentó una columna de trescientos milicianos del estado islámico y en tres horas de combate arrasó a la guarnición iraquí de más de tres mil hombres, le provocó quinientos muertos, cuatrocientos ejecutados en el plazo de veinticuatro horas y esto a pesar de que a diez kilómetros de distancia se encontraba la décima división del ejército iraquí, que se suponía que era la fuerza de elite que restaba, en manos del gobierno de Bagdad.

Por eso, es que este conflicto que ha surgido en Medio Oriente, la dimensión decisiva no está en la cuenca de los ríos Tigris y Éufrates, en los que se despliega en el momento actual, sino en el espacio mundial. Lo que está ocurriendo en esta región crucial de Medio Oriente, es un caso extraordinariamente nítido de crisis de gobernabilidad del sistema mundial. De ahí el vacío de poder, de ahí el inmenso vacío geopolítico. Por eso la respuesta es esencialmente en el plano político antes que en el estrictamente militar. Lo que ha ocurrido en este que es el mayor conflicto de la época, que absorbe por necesidad las energías de todo el sistema mundial, es que se resuelve en él la cuestión política de la gobernabilidad, un orden global, en proceso de construcción, después de que ha finalizado la estructura básica que mantuvo en pie al anterior orden global, que fue la hegemonía unipolar de los Estados Unidos, que es el fenómeno que no está más.

En estas condiciones es que se presenta este conflicto de envergadura extraordinaria, que muy probablemente establezca las condiciones para establecer, para resolver el acuerdo nuclear entre Irán y la comunidad internacional que se negocia este fin de semana en Omán. Muchas gracias.

**Rafael Grossi:** Thank you very much Dr. Castro for your intervention, I thank you touched a point on the strategic dimension of the current crisis in the Middle East, and I am sure we will get back to that subsequently.

Dr. Thakur, you are next. I am very glad to offer you the floor. Please...

**Ramesh Thakur:** Thank you, Rafael. I would like to begin by congratulating Irma on organizing this very important seminar, major, at this time. And thank you for asking me to be part of this panel.

Let me begin with a simple observation, we face two essential threats: climate change and nuclear weapons. As my colleague Gareth Evans keeps reminding us, nuclear weapons can kill us a lot faster though.... Now those who reject the reality of climate challenge are derided as in nihilist. Curiously, those who reject the reality of the threat of nuclear weapons appear as realist.
We have just heard an interesting presentation on the Middle East, just one comment from me on the Middle East. It is simply not credible to believe that Israel can be committed to keep its nuclear weapons indefinitely, but no other country in the region will be allowed ever to get nuclear weapons. In other words the relationship between nonproliferation and disarmament is symbiotic, cannot be separated, and even globally be have to pursue both with equal commitment and energy without prioritizing one. I would like to divide my fifteen minutes in three parts, not necessarily equal: First, some general comments, then some specific comments on Southern Asia and then on East Asia.

Asia encapsulates all the dimensions of the challenge of nuclear weapons. It has one of the five NPT licit nuclear weapon states, namely China, it has two of the three extra NPT nuclear armed states, namely India and Pakistan, and has the world’s only NPT breakout state: North Korea, who used to be a member of the NPT and then broke out of it. Like others with nuclear weapons, the Asian nuclear-armed states also are engaged in modernization, upgrade, diversification of across-the-sea, land, and air platforms, etc.

But Asia is unique in that it is the only continent with a number of nuclear warheads that are actually still increasing and they are increasing in all of the four countries we are talking about: China, India, Pakistan and North Korea. It is also a continent that has some of the worse more serious longest running frozen, projected inter-state conflicts. In other words, why we might have moved from interstate to internal, interstate conflicts elsewhere in the world? In Asia an interstate conflict differs very much from a middle issue. And of course that you will be aware highly credible, modernly a scenario analysis has shown, that even a limited regional nuclear war, between India and Pakistan could have catastrophic, global consequences, true nuclear winter-type of effects, for example, that in addition to initial large numbers killed by heat, blast and radiation, etc., damage to crop production, destruction of global food distribution networks, etc., up to one billion people could die from that limited military nuclear exchange.

Now having said that, I think the chances of a deliberate use of nuclear weapons are slim, extremely slim. And yet, most people who work in the field do believe that Southern Asia is at least, the likely setting for the next use of nuclear weapons. Why is that? Well, let me put three propositions to you: 1) No one can be confident that another Mumbai style terrorist attack will not take place on Indian soil again, through the activities of groups with significant connections backed to Pakistan. 2) Should that happen, no one can be confident that the government of India – whichever government is in power - will not respond militarily in one form or another. 3) If India does respond, through military retaliation against Pakistan, no one can be confident that the resulting war will not escalate through the conventional to the nuclear level.

So, we can’t be confident of escaping a nuclear war. And the mostly likely part of it would be through this sort of activities. And it is even conceivable that a particular Jihadist group might launch an attack on India, with the very goal of provoking a conflict, an armed conflict between the two countries that escalate on nuclear weapons – to nuclear weapons. Or to be able to get the hands on nuclear weapons in Pakistan, in the midst of a crisis when the command control safeguards and securities are a bit more relaxed than the procedures in place normally, which
also means that we need to go into the nature of the state of Pakistan in order to appreciate the dynamics and the threats and dangers.

Pakistan - of the nine countries that have nuclear weapons - is the only one where the military has been in charge of the policy, the military is in the control of the weapons, the military will decide whether or not to deploy and use them. Now, of course this is a continent that knows something about the dynamics of military rule over civilian leadership. But in addition, Pakistan is the only one of the nine that has a major irredentist claim to part of the territory under the control of its neighbor, which is also nuclear armed. It is the only one that has used and continues to use Jihadist elements as an instrument of state policy, a minority in a country where its influence has spread deep into structures and institutions of the state – which again, adds to the dangers.

On the other side, India has often been clever rather than sensible in acknowledging that it has conflicts and crosses with its neighbors. And putting serious efforts into resolving them, in part on this side it is the price of democracy, which makes it very difficult for a government to acknowledge that may be there is some justice and validity for the claims by, either Pakistan or China.

India has also compromised the quality of its democracy and federalism and seeming rights there too, in the way it has handled and mishandled the situation in Cashmere. But, nonetheless, if you want to understand the over-testing 1998, that is one of the things that you need to ask yourself. I am not a physicist or a scientist, but I do not believe even the United States could decide today that he wants to conduct under the test and be able to conduct it within a week. It requires some careful preparation over a long time. Pakistan responded immediately to India’s test in 1998.

And there is another puzzling comment from the Indian Minister at the time, to the effect that Pakistan’s testing vindicates our stands, and what he meant to us, that this proves that all these years that India had been complaining that China was assisting Pakistan, has been proved correct, because essentially China made the test, not Pakistan. So there is immediately a triangular linkage.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy is India specific. India’s biggest driver has always been China, but of course for China, India is a nuisance, its central benchmark is the United States. So on the one hand you can separate the elements inside the state of Pakistan - and domestic policy with India. On the other hand, you cannot skip it just for being in the South Asia, for being into Asia, but to very quickly getting into the dynamics of global politics as well.

So you cannot compartmentalize the politics of nuclear weapons to bilateral or regional levels. I think they are all inter-related. Which makes it of course very challenging to find this of coping with that. But, let me leave that for the moment there, and move to East Asia in interest of time as well.

North Korean regime is unique in the family of nations, a communist dynastic dictatorship with a third generation currently in control, that has this case on virtually its entire distance, guilty
of acts of aggression and civil provocations against these more prosperous and democratic Southern states, guilty of acts of state criminality in kidnapping Japanese citizens, smuggling them into North Korea; guilty of acts of terrorism, and of course, guilty of missile proliferation. It isn’t highly surprising then, that the prospect of usable and deliverable nuclear weapons in North Korean hands senses if not shivers down many smiles. North Korea began its nuclear weapons legal suit in the sixties, accelerated the program. In the eighties, withdrew from the NPT in 2003, and has conducted three tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013.

Having said that, we are not what we believe it has between six to eight nuclear bombs, but we do not think it has the delivery capability for getting targets even near little or far of it. For example, we do not believe it mastered the technology to miniaturize warheads and make them robust enough to withstand the rigors of a ballistic missile flight threatened by such as high gravity forces, vibrations, extreme changes and so on. Nor we know precisely or with any confidence the motives behind these military actions. Why are they doing it? Do they fear a genuine threat from the United States? Is the regime trying to bolster its domestic leadership capability by projecting the leader? Trying to ensure contribute support or the military to trying position themselves or to expect even more economic concessions from neighbors and the Western countries? Or thus trying to project an image that decisions of an irrational state be threat for us, we will react irrationally? We do not know.

Similarly we do not really know what to do. But we are worried that serious of miscalculations on misperceptions could actually lead to a nuclear exchange. North Korea could miscalculate threshold for retaliation; it could miscalculate Japanese and U.S. responses. We do not think that the new leader has the same skills as his father and grandfather in rating intention up and then recalculate intention down, as concessions starts flowing it. Nor do we know just what to do, why should contain not work with North Korea? Shall we just stay calm and keep doing what we need to do, regardless of the provocations that come from across the borders?

The most worrying thing, in this sense, is not that North Korea created a limited capability, but could it trigger crossing the nuclear threshold by South Korea and/or Japan as well. And certainly some people in these two countries in positions of responsible leadership have occasionally talked about that. But if you think of Japan as not a lot better than North Korea, internationally could Japan keep the empathy for constrain of the weapon option?

The U.S. extended nuclear deterrence bolsters the security confidence. Weaponization could drop the relation with Washington. Domestic leaders free non-nuclear principles and are in opposition of nuclear weapons. This raised strong nuclear allergy in domestic public opinion, and there is no indication that any of the existing leadership in Japan is prepared or contemplating going to nuclear weapons. So the key against this back-drop to resolving the issue is Beijing, for China these serious publications complicates its goals and relationships. If it strengthens the aligned sentimental Korea and Japan that is the negative. If there is within a cyclone near drama in its immediate region and could distract attention from its development: that is the negative. North Korea is not a reliable ally: that is the problem. Any nuclear war could come right up to its borders. Remember that is why China counted them into Beijing in 1990 and 1996. But being against Beijing would be the complete collapse of North Korea. And while the situation complicates its foreign policy, it is much more challenging the problem
posed to the United States. So I think China has tried to balance that over the last few years, has gradually come around to joining the international committee closer in putting pressure to North Korea, but you have not gone to the point, where that has been resolved.

So again, the regional dynamics linked of the global and that poses extra challenges, but of course it also increases the need for us to try to do something about it. Thank you very much.

Rafael Grossi: Thank you very much Ramesh for that quite captivating description of the challenges, and in particular in Asia. You bring a lot of elements which are interesting. I think though we are riding a bit later I think that is worth the while. In the presentations we were able to discern how many things we may wish to look into when assessing what the risks in general, and the nuclear risks in particular are in the increase or in the decrease.

First, Rolf painted a very wide-ranging fresco about what is going on right now, with a very particular an insightful emphasis on the Russian big question mark, and the options therein. Jorge Castro gave us a very captivating and dramatic recount of what is going on in the Middle East, and in particular the emergence of ISIS, the military threat it is Putin, and the unraveling of the traditional countries, some of the traditional countries in the region and the experience of their stabilizing factors that they provided. And lastly, of course, just a minute ago, Ramesh was giving us this quite captivating — as I said — description of how the sub-continental tensions come into play, and of course the ever running enigma of the DPRK case, and lastly China’s and Japan’s dilemmas. So I think we do have a lot of elements for your comments and your questions now addressed to our panelists. I believe we have somebody around the room that may be carrying a microphone or not, but I suppose that should be the way around. Yes, thank you. What I would propose is that when you take the floor, you identify yourselves, what is your affiliation, and who you are addressing your question to. So let us start with that, and I have a first question on my left – izquierda en el fondo, por favor, thank you very much.

Asistente 1: - Que tal, buen día – Juan Battaleme, de NPSGlobal – buen día a todos. Quería hacer una pregunta específica al Dr. Thakur es acerca del aceleramiento de los sistemas de defensa, de los sistemas de los escudos de defensa, tanto terrestres como navales en Asia. Qué impacto tienen, dentro de la posición general, si favorecen la ofensiva o favorecen la defensiva esa clase de modernización militar en Asia - tanto en China como en Japón, inclusive los desplegues navales que tiene Estados Unidos. Gracias.

Rafael Grossi: - Okay, I would propose that we, since we need to be efficient in the use of our time – I would propose that you answer the question try to be brief and take as many questions as possible, otherwise, subsequent questions be addressed to different issues. Go ahead with this question, please. Then I will give the floor to somebody else.

Ramesh Thakur: -Well, eh... is a good question. In our Center we take the position that elements of the nuclear platforms that contribute to deterrence stability, be do not mind so much. If you look at the situation in South Asia, for example, if in India and Pakistan were to base more of their nuclear weapons systems in submarines which are the least vulnerable to attack and therefore the most stable elements of the deterrence relationship, that is less worrying than Pakistan introducing battlefield nuclear weapons which to be useful have to
deployed on the forward edge of the battlefield, which also means that, despite denials there has to be an element of pre-delegation to commandos on the field to be able to use them, and this then has consequences for India’s posture as well, so it begins to be very complicated there as well. But in addition, of course once you get into a triangular relationship you have the stated doctrine. And we are fortunate in that to utterly the doctors in the room, to whom we may want to come back to that later on that..., but the stated doctrine is credible minimum deterrent and the argument of causes, but that which is credible for India against China cannot be minimum against Pakistan, for that which is minimum for India against Pakistan is unlikely to be credible against China. So there are these contradictions as well. And finally, of course, you may think your system is defensive, but battlefield’s rival is defensive.

Rafael Grossi: Very good. Here, please.

Asistente 2: Thank you. My name is Carlo Trezza, from Italy. First of all I want to say that fully share the analysis of Rolf Ekéus about the situation in Europe. I just wish to assure him that the concerns which are pelt in the North of Europe are also shared in Central and Southern Europe, about the development starting with Crimea, what is – I mean – the main concern in my view is the collapse or not working of all the instruments which have been established in the last decades exactly to prevent what has happened, I mean, I am talking about the Helsinki process, I am talking about the CFE treaty, I am talking about the Budapest - of course - Memorandum which is unfortunately not legally binding and the NATO-Russia dialogue, I mean all these instruments have not worked!, this is the big concern how to respond, I mean, the dialogue-dialogue at different levels, you mentioned the military level and the religious which are very important. Just week in Rome there was – organized by the Vatican - a meeting between religious authorities on nuclear issues, very interesting. To Jorge Castro, I am not sure that the origin of all this disaster in the Middle East is the Iranian revolution of the 1979, I think this is your interpretation, and too much time has elapsed since then and other developments have taken place, in any case. What I would like to ask you is what role you see in the Kurdish component. You have not mentioned it but I think that Kurds are playing a very important role – I would say a stabilizing role, but this is a question of interpretation. Finally to Mr. Ramesh Thakur, a centrality of the role of China, I agree, should China become more of a leader, especially in Asia and be the first to ratify the CTBT Treaty not to wait for the U.S. for once they should be the leaders, and then hopefully India and Pakistan would follow through. Thank you.

Rafael Grossi: Let us go one by one, because I believe Ambassador Trezza has questions or comments addressed to three panelists. Perhaps, Rolf, would you like start? Then Jorge Castro.

Rolf Ekéus: Only that I totally share your concern. I mean, I mentioned that these institutions, CFE, for instance still, it could be necessary, but also others. We need also the strategic talks. What about the situation of European nuclear weapons, the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and so on? I think that it is in the same situation of poor diplomacy, we are in a very bad situation in Europe. Of course we like each other and that is the best element, image. But I think, we must understand that Russia is a big problem that we have not necessarily approve but we must comprehend the sense of pride and the sensitivity of Russia, without, so to say, soften our attitude to them.
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Rafael Grossi: Thank you very much.

Jorge Castro: Una de las consecuencias fundamentales de la desintegración del Estado Iraquí, es el surgimiento de un estado kurdo de manera independiente. Lo que me gustaría agregar, es sobre el significado, la naturaleza política del islamismo revolucionario y por lo tanto, su relación y origen en la revolución islámica de Irán de 1979. Lo que conviene advertir es que este fenómeno que es el islamismo revolucionario, ISIS o Estado Islámico, no es una variante de una corriente religiosa sobre todo del mundo chiita de Medio Oriente, es una corriente surgida en el campo de batalla con conocimiento de las técnicas más avanzadas de combate occidentales, sobre todo en los diez años de enfrentamientos contra el Ejército Rojo soviético en Afganistán, liderados entre ellos, las principales figuras en el enfrentamiento contra el ejército rojo en Afganistán, fue un ingeniero de Saudi Arabia denominado Osama Ben Laden. La consecuencia de esta interpretación es que lo que está en marcha en Medio Oriente no es una corriente - una vertiente - de carácter religioso, sino que es esencialmente una manifestación de praxis político-militar que dispone de los conceptos y de las técnicas más avanzadas de combate y de pensamiento revolucionario del mundo actual.

Lo que yo quisiera agregar, es una referencia al problema del significado que tiene el hecho de que Israel disponga del único arsenal nuclear que existe en Medio Oriente. Israel dispone de un arsenal nuclear de aproximadamente, se estima, unas doscientas armas nucleares. Esto garantiza su supervivencia estratégica, incluso ante una situación del más extremo conflicto. Lo que al mismo tiempo garantiza, es que se ve obligado a enfrentar las manifestaciones extremas de la guerra asimétrica precisamente por su poderío estratégico fundamental en materia nuclear, y es lo que ha ocurrido en las últimas dos semanas con el estallido de la tercera Intifada con epicentro en Jerusalén, que está en juego en el momento actual.

Rafael Grossi: Muchas gracias. Ramesh?

Ramesh Thakur: - Yes absolutely, we in the center argue and advocate it. There is no reason why China has to wait for the United States. It can ratify the CTBT. There is no reason why India and Pakistan have to wait further, they can also do that. We also go further and say that unlike – for example – the UN convention on the Law of the Sea which has not going into force without the United States being part of it, if the United States, is the only barrier to the entry into force of the CTBT it would exert enormous pressure on American policy makers assuming the Congress, to come on board, because they thought they would be in danger as I am telling you so.

Having said that, I have also never understood why the countries that negotiated the texts of the CTBT adopted this curious egregious and ultimately self-defeating enter-into-force formula, and why the world just has not changed that and bring it into force. If we had had an equivalent enter –into-force formula for other arms control agreements, almost all of them would still not have been entered into force, including NPT itself. So I think we need to go...pay some attention back towards own collective stupidity, and having designed it in such a way that you cannot enter into force. And as I said, if you think of other arms control
agreements, which one would survive that very intriguing, or curiously sub-dividing, for only good said words.

Rafael Grossi: Thank you very much. Vamos aquí, por favor, segunda fila, aquí...

Asistente 3: Carlos Pisolitto, del Centro de Estudios Santa Romana. Una pregunta aprovechando la disertación del Dr. J. Castro y de Ramesh Thakur. Nos ha dicho Jorge Castro que los estados fallidos los que están favoreciendo el avance del califato de ISIS del Estado Islámico. En su segunda intervención Jorge Castro mencionó Afganistán, yo me gustaría mencionar un tercer país que es Pakistán. Mi pregunta concreta es: existe posibilidad de que Pakistán, que es un país poseedor de armas nucleares, se convierta en un estado fallido? y esa corriente que bien Jorge Castro no la cataloga como religiosa sino técnica, militar y operativa pueda contagiar y llegar hasta Pakistán y esas fuerzas extremistas tengan un acceso a un arsenal nuclear?

Jorge Castro: Bueno, lo que mantiene en pie a Pakistán como estado, e impide - hasta ahora - que se convierta en un estado fallido es que el estado en Pakistán es sinónimo de su ejército y en general de sus fuerzas armadas, es el hecho de que el estado pakistání es esencialmente el ejército de Pakistán lo que mantiene escasamente unido a este país en proceso de desintegración estatal-territorial desde que surgió como estado en 1947.

Rafael Grossi: Ramesh...

Ramesh Thakur: I think that it is a genuine worry. It is a bloodshed worry, and of course, it is particularly worrying for India being right there. I think the Pakistani argument is that they have adequate controls, they have full safeguards, and they also point out - of course – a truth accurately, that they have lost more soldiers in the fight against Jihadists than has any other country – and that part is true as well. But nonetheless I do not think any of us sleep well at that reassurance because the threat is very real, of internal capture of this evidence or external attacks. And the attacks have been increasing in frequency but also in sophistication on military insurrections, some by the Jihadist and we know that – we believe – that some of these insurrections are storage areas of nuclear materials and weapons.

Rafael Grossi: - Thank you very much. We move to Ambassador Sood.

Asistente 4: Thank you Mr. Chairman for providing the backdrop and my compliments to all the three panelists for extremely lucid, coherent presentations. I have a general comment which I think translates into questions to all the three of them, and which is that, I think historical narratives are extremely important, and I will just take a minute to explain. Let us take the first one, which Ambassador Ekéus refer to when he brought the focus on Europe. There is a conflicting historical narrative here in terms of post-Cold War history, which is that in the then Russian leaderships’ point of view, post-Cold War history was supposed to be a multi-polar history. And that disillusion of wars so bad was not supposed to lead to natural expansion. We can get into history about, because lots of people have written their memoires about it. But on the other side, the U.S. or the Western narratives of post-Cold War history is a different one which led to a uni-polar moment and all the rest of it and the need to expansion
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eastwards as we saw it. So how do you resolve these conflicting narratives of history, let began to the Middle East with Prof. Castro explained in wonderful detail, and here you have a conflicting narrative of history which goes back to as it refers to the 1914 Sykes-Picot pact which created artificial or new states, not looking at natural barriers of ethnicity, community and so on. And we see what the prospects of dissolution of those nation structures and dissolution including-of-military structures, and particularly in Iraq and in that region, possibly divisions in Syria what it is leading to. And finally if it comes to Asia Pacific we look again at conflicting-historical narratives in terms of this in continent, which Prof. Ramesh Thakur referred to. So therefore, I think resolving conflicting historical narratives, particularly, whether they are deep-seated and have converted themselves into this dimension becomes extremely important. Thank you.

Rafael Grossi: Thank you very much. Would you like to briefly react to Ambassador Sood comments and then will take..., we have time for one more question, we really have need to wrap up, otherwise we will disturb the normal development of our Conference. So, please, very shortly...

Rolf Ekéus: It is clear that Gorbachev negotiated the matter of unification of Germany. He did that with the President Bush Senior and with Helmut Kohl. And there was a clear understanding in the initial talks that no NATO weapons or forces should be stationed or deployed in the old East German part. Later on, however, so that was an understanding, which still is alive in Moscow. Then of course, the problem was the Soviets still existing economic desperate situation and the one who had to help Soviets and the East Germans so they talked and discussed and the matter was not raised again so much. So, in essence the undertaking, which was not certainly decreed in written form, was reinterpreted first, and that again was an understanding for everyone living at that time that there should be no NATO forces in that part of Germany then, because situation changes with the whole world so pegged, so they set up, collapsed, and still it was a very cautious attitude but gradually this has been neglected more and more. So we have two interpretations: that Gorbachev is still the one who insists on his under Russia support, there he is not very popular – otherwise but there, there is an agreement. So I agree with you back is this is a very poisonous element still and the bitterness of the NATO expansion direct against Russia is certain, certain treason but they were very weak, they were very weak at the time the Russians so they had little towards us, especially when Soviet Union collapsed then yet, they did not bothered very much about these things.

Rafael Grossi: Thank you. ...Ramesh?

Ramesh Thakur: Ambassador Sood is actually right in highlighting the centrality of identity politics to so many conflicts around the world. And he is right in drawing attention to the fact that history- and myth-making are contested terrains precisely because they are crucial to constructing a social political natural identity. So I agree with that. But just one further comment and that is that: yes, conflicts are a prime motivator for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, then they might lead to the use of nuclear weapons, and the use of nuclear weapons can increase the whole of the consequences of conflicts therefore. But, we should never halt the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons that we use them in the mean time, hostage to the
ending of conflicts first, I think that we have to pursue both because they are done on parallel tracks rather than sequentially one being depending on the other.

Rafael Grossi: Thank you very much. Ok, I have one more – one last question for this panel. Please, go ahead.

Asistente 5: Edgardo Aguilera, del Diario Ámbito Financiero. Los panelistas han mencionado a tres países en la descripción de conflictos y sus implicancias, que han sido Rusia, Irán por otro lado y también China cuando se mencionó la cuestión de Asia. En este marco, la pregunta es la siguiente: el gobierno de la Argentina – como sabemos y es un dato – ha hecho acuerdos de asociación estratégica con dos de ellos: Rusia por un lado, China por otro, que además el último compromiso es comercial y además está la participación de China en la provisión, o digamos así, logística y servicios para el nuevo proyecto Atucha. Con Irán – como todo el mundo sabe – fue la proximidad para tratar de llegar a una solución, o una... a la cuestión de la AMIA para no hacer más datos. La pregunta concreta es: cómo se percibe o se percibiría a la Argentina en este contexto en el marco de las descripciones que se han hecho aquí, motivo de este Seminario, es decir el de la seguridad nuclear?

Rafael Grossi: Muchas gracias. Quizás Dr. Castro quisiera Ud. comentar la pregunta. The question is center on Argentina so maybe I would go, first of all, to Dr. Castro.

Jorge Castro: Bueno, la cuestión nuclear en América Latina está resuelta desde el año 1989, ‘90, por el acuerdo entre Brasil y la Argentina que colocó los sistemas nucleares de los dos países bajo un sistema de supervisión mutua. En este sentido, América Latina, gracias al acuerdo entre Brasil y la Argentina se ha convertido en una región absolutamente estable en lo que se refiere a las armas nucleares. Lo que hay que agregar es que el acuerdo entre la Argentina e Irán sobre los acontecimientos provocados por las intervenciones terroristas que afectaron a la sede de la AMIA, la organización de la colectividad judía argentina, más la Embajada del Estado de Israel respondió a una iniciativa de Irán, no de la Argentina. Y esta iniciativa es parte – claramente – del proceso del proceso de negociación que todo indica que puede culminar esta semana misma, entre el gobierno de Irán y la comunidad internacional para resolver el conflicto nuclear entre Irán y la comunidad internacional, que es el principal conflicto de seguridad internacional de la época y que transformaría la relación de fuerzas a escala mundial. En este sentido, conviene ubicar la situación de la Argentina en su relación con Irán en una forma subordinada a este acuerdo fundamental, que probablemente se esté negociando, o se haya ya acordado esta semana en Omán, sobre el Golfo Pérsico.

Rafael Grossi: Thank you very much. Well, I think we come to the end of what has been, at least to me, a very interesting hour and fifty minutes, I am sorry if we ran a bit late, so I would like to ask you to offer our guests a warm applause for their contributions. So we go for a short break, and after that it is Disarmament and Non-proliferation. Thank you very much. Muchas gracias.