Panel 3: Seguridad nuclear – Estrategias de prevención del terrorismo nuclear y el tráfico de materiales y tecnología

Emiliano Buis: Bienvenidos, nuevamente. Si les parece, vamos a dar entonces inicio a la sesión de la tarde, a los paneles de la tarde.

El tercer panel, que vamos a escuchar ahora, es sobre Seguridad nuclear, estrategias de prevención del terrorismo nuclear y del tráfico ilícito de materiales y de tecnología. Este panel está moderado por Joan Rohlfing, quien es desde 2010 Presidente y Directora de Operaciones del Nuclear Threat Initiative, de Estados Unidos. Es responsable de las gestiones de todos los programas y operaciones de NTI, co-dirige la Secretaría del Nuclear Security Project, que es un esfuerzo por impulsar la acción global para reducir nucleares inminentes.

En el corriente año ha sido nombrada Miembro del Consejo Asesor del Secretario de Industria de los Estados Unidos, y participa de las Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear como asesora en las Cumbres de la Industria. Anteriormente se desempeñó en el Departamento de Energía.

Los expositores incluyen en primer lugar a Ian Kearns, del Reino Unido, Director del European Leadership Network. Anteriormente fue Vice-Director del Institute for Public Policy Research. Se desempeñó como asesor especialista de la Cámara de los Comunes y Cámara de los Lores en el Comité de Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional. Fue Director del Programa de Postgrado en Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Sheffield. En segundo lugar, Ronda Evans, de la División de Seguridad Nuclear del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica – OIEA. Graduada en Leyes por la Universidad de Sidney, se ocupa en el OIEA de asesorar a los estados miembros en cuanto a las series de seguridad nuclear y conduce sesiones de entrenamiento y misiones de revisión entre pares. Antes de su posición actual ejerció funciones en el Gobierno Federal de Australia, principalmente en la Agencia de Radio-protección y Seguridad Nuclear. Finalmente Gustavo Ainchil quien es Director de Seguridad Internacional Nuclear en Asuntos Nucleares y Espaciales – DIGAN – del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Es Diplomático de Carrera, con el rango de Embajador, estuvo destinado en la Misión Argentina para el Desarme, en la Embajada Argentina en la República Oriental del Uruguay y en la Misión Permanente de la República Argentina ante las Naciones Unidas. Actualmente se desempeña como sherpa por la Argentina en el proceso de las Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear.
Doy entonces la palabra a Joan, como moderadora...

Joan Rolhfing: So, thank you very much for that kind introduction. I am going to take a few minutes to do a little bit of a synthesis for this session on nuclear materials security. And I am going to start back at the beginning, which is: Why we should care about nuclear materials security? What is the threat?

Most of you are rather familiar with this, but the reason we are concerned about materials security, is that terrorists..., hey! We are having a little bit of a technical issue with the slides! Terrorists have stated their desire to try and acquire the material or a weapon. We know that Al Qaeda has stated that acquiring nuclear weapons is a religious duty. We also know that there are approximately two thousand tons of weapons usable materials, around the world: plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Many of those materials are at sites that are inadequately secured.

The international community is still not properly organized to address this deficit and I think it goes without saying that we are only a strong as the weakest link. So let us focus on what we can do as an international community to try to improve materials security. One of the significant challenges we have today is that there is no effective global system for securing these materials. Well, there are many existing agreements, guidelines and multilateral mechanisms. They fall short they are not intern., they are not binding the international standards, they are guidelines, some excellent guidelines published by the IAEA, but they are not binding nor do they cover all nuclear materials. They cover only civilian nuclear materials around the world.

There is also not an accountability mechanism. While the IAEA does have safeguards inspections, that, is really to account for, and the account material at sites is not to look at the security of those sites. In the context of the Nuclear Security Summits, and there have been three Summits now, with the fourth one scheduled for 2016, there has been a very good international dialogue among quite a few of the sherpas. And one of the innovations that has come out of those dialogues and in some ways these points have made their way into the Communiqué: there is a growing consensus about what the key elements of a global nuclear materials security system should look like. And it essentially boils down to these four principles: the first principle, that all nuclear weapons materials should be covered, not just civilian materials but military materials as well, which comprise approximately 85% of the weapons usable materials in the world.

The second principle is that all states should adhere international standards and best practices. It is time for us rather than having an ad-hoc approach where each state follows its own version of security, where we have some kind of standardization and we will find ways to share practices with each other.

The third principle is that states need to help build confidence on their effectiveness in the security practices by taking reassuring actions, confidence building actions to demonstrate that
their materials really are secure, it is no longer good enough to continue to tell each other: do not worry about it I have got it covered. My material is secure.

The fourth and final principle is that states need to work to reduce this risk over time, by minimizing all were feasible by eliminating these materials in the locations, the numbers of locations where they are found, this is an ongoing process, but one where we had some success especially with respect of highly enriched uranium.

So one at drill down, and just a few of these principles, I want to talk military materials just for a moment to share some information that is not widely understood. As I mentioned earlier, the military materials comprise 85% of the global stocks of weapons usable nuclear materials. Now, some people have said that the Nuclear Security Summits actually do not cover these military materials at all. And we were encouraged to see that now, in several of the Communiqués at the Nuclear Security Summits there is broad language that says that it is the responsibility of states to maintain effective security of all nuclear and other radioactive materials, including nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons. This is really an important concept for states to have embraced in the context of the Summits. The next challenge, however, is working on creating some mechanisms and some security standards, and some transparency around those military materials, because those do not yet exist.

I just wanted to share a pie-chart with you, showing again the global percentages, this one in a little bit more detail. There is a popular misconception that we cannot work together on the security of military materials because those materials are far too sensitive, and in fact there is an assumption that all those materials are all classified. And what this chart demonstrates is that of all of that is that 85% of the pie, approximately 23% of the material is in warheads form, either in active warheads or retired warheads.

A vast majority of materials is in different and less sensitive forms in the naval fuel cycle or the reserve of highly enriched uranium set aside for naval fuel, a good portion of that in the U.S. It is in this big purple-black at the bottom the 43% of material that is in bulk form, involves processing facilities, some of that is for research. Some of it is weapons components that are in the process of being dismantled and disposition. And then there is 11% that the U.S. and Russia had between the two of them declared exhausted for military purposes. I would maintain that there are some good opportunities within these other pie wedges to try to develop some transparency majors to build confidence in the status of those materials.

The other point I wanted to talk briefly about, was the issue of reducing and eliminating nuclear materials. Many of you are familiar with the excellent work that has been done over the last several decades at removing highly enriched uranium from sites around the world. There is a great track-record there. We have reduced, we removed some very small amounts of plutonium, but from many different states – from than twenty five states – we have removed highly enriched uranium and eliminated it entirely from those countries so what we literally cut on half the
number of countries that possess highly enriched uranium and plutonium as a result of that process.

However, this process has been almost exclusively focused on highly enriched uranium to date, and almost exclusively focused on highly enriched uranium in the civilian sphere. And you can see that, on the left hand side of the graph it is representing the amount of HEU stockpiled in the world, approximately 1,500 metric tons, that near blue wedge is where we have made some good progress in the last few years. So you can see there is so much more to do. Also I want to draw your attention to the right side at this slide however, because this is an untold story, a scenario where we need to work much harder as a community.

You see that the stockpiles of plutonium are smaller overall, global stockpiles just below of 500 metric tons, however in much larger percentage blue wedge, there you see the percentage, in the civil sector. And you can see underneath the number of bomb equivalence that this plutonium represents compared to the bomb equivalence that the HEU represents. So this is just a way of saying that, even if we have made a great progress on HEU we have so much further to go. We really need to work on creating some standards and mechanisms for addressing the plutonium as well, because as the HEU inventories are coming down fortunately our plutonium inventories are continuing to grow, and that is because we are producing and separating from the civilian stockpile. So that brings me to a final synthesis slide as we would need to do in the 2016 Summit. And I left here Five Priorities that have developed by a collective number of voices from outside and inside of government through the Fissile Material Working Group, through the Nuclear Security Governance Expert Group and also through the Global Dialogue which is a process that NTI has been leading and what is interesting to me is that even though there are multiple processes underway and there are high degree of convergence about what opportunities are for the 2016 Summit. So, you know, this mirrors very closely the four principles of an effective nuclear security system that we talked about a little bit earlier:

1. Make the regime comprehensive, covering all materials.
2. Share information, find ways to build confidence through transparency, and transparency measures through declarations.
3. Work on implementing best practices and standards, and this requires that we first create a set of standards.
4. Offer plans for what we talk about in the last graphic for eliminating civil HEU and reducing plutonium, and I would add for weapons usable HEU as well.
5. And finally, create a sustainable mechanism for continued progress is really essential as we reach whatever one expects to be the end of the Summit process. That we to find the way to continue a high level of dialogue on these critical issues so that we can make progress, because this agenda will not be done nor up to get completed this by 2016.

So let us stop with that, and we will turn to our next speaker, Ian Kearns, and move on from there. Thank you.
Ian Kearns: Thank you very much indeed, Joan. Let me start by saying that I agree with all of that, every word of it. I would like to make five additional points, which I think a little more overtly political in terms of how we think about the challenge.

The first is, and as Joan just said at the end of her remarks: everyone expects the next Summit in 2016 to be the last Summit. That is something I find very concerning, as in the direction of the organization, which in the recent, recent weeks mobilized a large group of European leaders to intervene in the Ebola crisis in West Africa, as a network we thought – it was crucial to say - that there is to be a leadership level engagement on the Ebola crisis, you know, at Summit level. And it seems to me there is difficult to tell the world on the one hand that this is a crucial challenge, where we need much more to address, and the other hand for everyone to accept, the leaders will no longer engage in a Summit level process. Now I understand there are reasons why the dialogue needs this direction. But for me, it is a bad signal to send, and I think the only reason why there should not continue to be Summits post 2016 is a lack of direction, and I think it should be challenged. This is the first point I just want to make.

The second, it is I think that we need to keep working abroad in the participation in the Summit process itself in 2016. Now, there are only – I think - 53 countries that took part in the last Summit, out of 190 plus states that could not taken part in terms of U.N. members. Some important states are missing like Belarus, Uzbekistan, even Iran. And here, I think, there is a political challenge in the sense that our... and I guess the challenge in the U.S. government as well as in everywhere else, that the nuclear security issues specialists, I think need to be talking a lot more than regional security specialists into the country, specialists about how you can bring some of these players to the table – I attended a meeting with the delegation of government officials from Belarus in London, just a week ago, and it was very clear to me that in general geopolitical terms, Belarus is thinking about how it can avoid becoming a battleground between Russia and the West, is thinking about its geopolitical position. I think there are opportunities in terms of engaging a country like Belarus, linking this issue to other issues, to give them something they want, in order to encourage them to engage more in this area where we would like them to engage.

We could say the same thing, of course, about Iran, it could possibly be published a much bigger package of changes which take place in the relationship with Iran, if the nuclear deal can be both agreed and successfully ratified and implemented. Now I understand these challenges are direct extremely difficult and complex. All I am suggesting it is that there are opportunities, there are political opportunities due to things which are necessarily to do with the nuclear security agenda now already defined, which gives us an opportunity to broaden the participation in the Summit process moving forward, that’s the second point.

The third point I would like to make, I think that it is important that we try to mobilize a wider group of states, which are not involved in the Nuclear Security Summit process to help in addressing this challenge.
Some of the states not involved in the Summit process could help through ratification of employment of international instruments, could help to get some of these instruments into force. Irma Arguello who has been obviously a crucial figure in developing today’s Conference and the Latin American Leadership Network in a recent presentation to the E.U. Consortium Conference on nuclear risks pointed out correctly that if 22 countries in Latin America and Caribbean Region would ratify the amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, it would be enough to get that instrument enter into force. And so, that is an indication that countries that are not involved directly in the Summit process, as they are in this region, can be doing useful things. So that is my third point.

My fourth point, it is actually that I think, it seems to me as if someone periodically deeps in and out of the nuclear security materials debate. One of the challenges is that far too many countries in the world consider this to be not their problem. Far too many countries in the world have other issues, which frankly are higher up in their list of national security priorities and concerns they are worried about. This is an understandable reason, states face all kinds of difficult challenges, but nonetheless, if one wants a system, a global system, which is comprehensive and universal then, we have to think about of ways of mobilizing a larger number of countries; to think about this is their problem. And here, I think, the challenge is not really related to the Summit process. I would not recommend that we try to broaden up the Summit agenda enormously to cover other issues. But the political framing of the issue, it seems to me, is extremely important. So, for example, a detonation of a single nuclear device, a bomb, I suppose to be dirty bomb alone, perhaps either, would have enormous global consequences – it seems to me – economically. I mean, imagine a scenario in which a terrorist group detonates one bomb. It is highly unlikely that that terrorist group will not immediately follow that detonation with at least a claim, they have access to modern more one weapon. The level of panic and chaos that that would cause globally would be extraordinary, even if we were looking at the situation of a very serious dirty bomb in a city like New York, you could be talking about huge economic dislocation and panic.

Now I think why dam the future, the international economy, if I can put it in such crude terms, that is going to have major consequences. I do not think how explicit about what they are and I think there are economic motives about these consequences could be, could be a useful way of taking this issue and explaining many others around the world about why this is the issue, this is not just an issue just for the United States or the United Kingdom, they might feel like it is in the front line of threats from terrorism.

Secondly, I think there is an issue around the environmental impacts of any kind of major nuclear security incident. Here the Fukushima accident in Japan I think is important and led to – as we know – a whole change of policy in many countries. Germany, for example, decided to go out the power business altogether. That had a direct impact on the European Union capability to deliver on CO2 massive reduction targets, because the use of nuclear weapons was an industrial of the limits for achieving climate change targets.
There are around the world right now, according to the World Nuclear Association, some 71 civil nuclear plants under construction. I further some 174 already planned and other point in which construction will begin soon, another 301 with concrete proposals on the table, which should be considered.

Some of you, I mean, have seen with relief that the U.S. and Chinese governments come to an agreement on climate change targets in the last week, and it was terrific. But the same Institute in China which helped the Chinese government to arrive as new strategy, has also just announced that a very large number of additional nuclear power plants will need to be built in China. Over and above, I think it is the 28th, which should currently been built— if China is going to meet that climate change reduction in target. Well, I mention all these points because if we can be very serious about a nuclear security incident, something even on a larger scale than Fukushima in terms of its effect, you can see a very strong popular backlash against all things, nuclear. And if that happens, whether one is in favor of nuclear power or not, the fact is many countries around the world have factored civil nuclear power into their carbon emission reduction targets.

And if a consequence of this kind of incident were to impact that strategy, we could be facing a really major challenge to our ability to limit climate change to under 2°C. Now this is just a way to illustrate that there are kind of ways of framing this problem into territory, which make clear to everybody that this is a global challenge, with global consequences and ramifications, and in which everybody needs to get engaged. So that is my fourth point. We need to do some re-framing of this politically.

And my final point, relates to 85% of material, military or non-civilian as Joan pointed out earlier. Some months ago, drawing from the work of journal with colleagues of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, five members of the European Leadership Network published an opinion piece calling for action on this 85%. The signatures of that statement were the former French Defense Minister, Paul Quilès; from the U.K., the former Defense Minister Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the former U.K. Defense Secretary Des Brown, he is with us at the Conference today, General Bernard Norlain from France, who is also with us at the Conference today, and former French Defense Minister Hervé Morin. They all are highly credible people, and acknowledge the danger that comes in regards to the 85% of materials not in civil use, but in the military sector. And in the op-ed piece, they challenge the assumption that materials in the military sector are somehow by definition more secure than materials in the civil sector. And I would just like to read you a couple of sentences from the op-ed to illustrate that point. They say: “If the United States could mistakenly fly six nuclear weapons cross country, have missile launch officers fall asleep on the job with the doors to launch control facilities open, and allow a 85 years old nun to successfully cut through four layers of fencing and deface a national storage vault for highly enriched uranium, surely there is reason to be concerned.” Obviously I would echo that statement. One of the important things in this op-ed, is that they suggest points about the states taking measures to reassure each other, taking demonstrable steps that they can need to be assured to each other about their nuclear security practices, they are former ministers and officials called for the U.K., France and the U.S. to
work together to lead, to create some kind of assurance mechanism, where they work with each other to demonstrate to each other their practices in this area. This is a risky highly sensitive area because people are worried about sharing a... or losing state secrets effectively in this area. So can these countries, those three countries that are on the NATO alliance and work together closely politically on a whole range of issues, try to force some mechanism in this place to demonstrate that this can be done? Where is its useful proposal, and I think it is done and I think we can be working on this specifically from now. So I agree with everything that Joan said based on some additional points, I think, which you can take into consideration over and above what she said. Thank you.

Joan Rohlfing: Thank you, Ian. I love it when people agree with everything I said. Thank you very much! We will turn now to Rhonda Evans.

Rhonda Evans: In the words of my countryman Gareth Evans, I am going to speak to you from the bottom of the mountain, which is in effect the nuclear security work of the Agency. And not only am I speaking to you from the bottom of the mountain, but because my Director, Khammar Mrabit, unfortunately could not be with you, I am also speaking to you as someone who is at the cold face of putting into practice and assisting states on this done nuclear security, as a senior nuclear security officer within our Division.

What I was asked to share with you was the IAEA nuclear security program, and my own take on that is to reflect on the importance of effective implementation of the existing international legal instruments that we have related to nuclear security, because one of the key issues that we are looking at it is the creation of sustainable national nuclear security regimes throughout our members states. But I was also asked to focus on areas where we could find an improvement in the implementation of that system. And just by way of background the IAEA currently has 162 member states, and following of the endorsement of the Board of Governors in the General Conference we expect 3 more, once their legal instruments have been deposited with us. So, in my role, I literally travel from Egypt to Burkina Faso, to Angola to Vietnam to the Philippines to Fiji, trying to work with all these member states to actually address some of the issues that my fellows painless have been talking about, about how you capture the attention at a political level at the institutional and organizational level about the importance of nuclear security.

So what is the IAEA nuclear security program? This is a slide we commonly use to depict what the description of a definition of nuclear security is. And this is described in the Nuclear Security Fundamentals document, which is a big topic on hierarchy and guidance. So it is the detection, the prevention and the response to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed to nuclear material, added radioactive material, their associated facilities and associated activities. This work is around addressing the actions of non-state actors.

Nuclear security is fundamentally a part of a state’s national security regime rather. And I guess to address one of the issues Ian was talking about in my work with member-states. When I have the
competent authorities in the room for a workshop on nuclear security, I am indeed talking to national security and intelligence service officers, to customs and border protection, to regulatory authorities and often to senior officials – representatives of ministries and departments who want to understand the importance of the nuclear security program. This also is another way of depicting at as my eminent cartoonist and nuclear law expert cartoon story is about, often comes up with pictures to illustrate what we are talking about. And the main part of our work is actually, the chapter where I guess you are alright, the adversary, the unauthorized person who wants to undertake activities to cause harm, because the objective of nuclear security similarly to the objective of nuclear safety, is to protect the hope and safety of people, to protect the environment, to protect society from the harmful effects of a nuclear security event. And that is uppermost in our guidance and our work with member states.

So the vision for nuclear security as promulgated by the Agency is to achieve worldwide effective security wherever nuclear or radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport. And it is very important I think, and it has been recognized in many international fora that the IAEA has a central role to play for international cooperation and assistance in this very important area.

We have had a succession of nuclear security plans commencing in 2002 which basically divided our work up into key program and elements. Now this program is endorsed by the policy organs of the IAEA, for instance the Board of Governors and the General Conference, which is implemented by our Division.

So, one of the main objectives we have heard some discussions today about the international legal framework for nuclear security. And the role of the Agency is to facilitate states adherence to that international legal framework of those instruments, which provide the underpinning for the nuclear security regime. Our work is always done upon the request of member states. We do not have the same role as the Safeguards Department, for instance, we are not the super regulator of nuclear security, because states understand and accept and indeed tell us, it is their sovereign responsibility to implement nuclear security. So our actions are always at their request but we have a very structured program because not only do we want to assist them establishing nuclear security regimes nationally, but we want them to be sustainable – that is effective over the time.

We have, and I will put them all up, and then I will discuss with you on them, because I think that some of the comments have been made on this panel it is worth our addressing in terms of the key modalities that the IAEA is using. We have heard mention of the desirability of international standards for nuclear security, and this quite a complex and a vex issue, particularly when states say to us: “we want your guidance on nuclear security, but you do not mandate standards for us in nuclear security.” But we have now developed a very comprehensive guidance series as I mentioned with fundamentals at the top: three recommendation documents and a set of implementing guides to give key guidance to member states about best practices in implementing national nuclear security regimes. And this is at every level, from the less of the regulatory regime
the key institutions and organizations, and specific systems and measures that you need to put in place, to protect and secure, to detect and to respond.

And just very quickly, my panel member Ian mentioned the fact that what if a dirty bomb exploded? How do you describe the impact to a state? How do you get politically leaders to take this seriously? Well, quite recently – in fact – the Moroccans hosted a combined three exercises, it is an emergency respond exercise, but for the first time we have an scenario which was a nuclear security event: the explosion of a dirty bomb in a major port in Morocco. Now the reason that this exercise was so fundamentally important is tested by the IAEA response system as well as the member state. And it drew very specific attention to the implications of such a nuclear security event. And Morocco has shared the lessons learned and shared the outcomes of an exercise with a very large number of other member states, including with the national competent authority for that emergency, the response organization within a state. So we are working very hard to make sure that the member states understand the impact and the importance of nuclear security.

We have some modalities which are probably more directed at states with developing and emerging nuclear security regimes, and what we are trying to focus on as well is that the mature countries actively request peer review missions and other important components, to demonstrate to others the effectiveness and the impact of their nuclear security systems.

So, very quickly, the issues and challenges before I wrap up: The IAEA convened an International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security in 2013. And the ministers present there made a declaration about nuclear security. And once they recognized the achievements that had been made, they also strongly acknowledged that more needs to be done to strengthen the nuclear security worldwide. And indeed I apologize for the length of the next slide, but the key issue is what our Director General Amano had to say on the occasion of the Nuclear Security Summit. He acknowledged the progress that had been made in nuclear security, he acknowledged the commitment of global leaders to this important issue, however he also acknowledged that there is still nuclear material missing, that there still nuclear facilities that are inadequately protected, and there is not in all places a very effective border of security. And the threat of nuclear terrorism does remain real, so he would be saying: keep your eye on this!, keep working with us!

So, two things I would like to bring your attention in conclusion: it is of fundamental importance to the International Atomic Energy Agency that the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material enters into force and that the expansion of its core to include physical protection measures for nuclear security and nuclear material robbing and domestic use and transport and nuclear facilities become realized.

The other future improvement is the establishment of truly comprehensive national nuclear security regimes in each state, that there is increased cooperation and assistance among states and that the IAEA is in a position to continue make the demand for its services and assistance. So, here is the important issue: was there continue to be a dialogue internationally in relation of the
adequacy of the existing internationally legal framework. I think what is really important is that we implement the framework that exists, and in particular that is the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This is and remains a priority for the IAEA. And the program of the Agency – the central role of the Agency – should also be continued to be recognized to assist states put in place effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes to have an overall effective global nuclear security regime. Thank you very much for your attention.

Joan Rohlfing: Thank you very much. Well, now we will turn out to Gustavo Anchil.

Gustavo Anchil: Buenas tardes, muchísimas gracias Joan.

El hecho de que ya hayan transcurrido tres Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear nos brinda bastantes elementos de juicio como para poder hacer una evaluación de cuáles son los progresos, cuáles son las experiencias que hemos adquirido y cuáles son los desafíos que tenemos por delante. Quizás como primer logro podemos destacar que las Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear le han dado una gran visibilidad a la cuestión, la presencia de Jefes de Estado discutiendo estas importantes cuestiones, considerando medidas en común para tomar sin duda ha elevado la visibilidad de este tipo de agenda. También las Cumbres han colaborado a dar una visión general del tema, a consolidar la noción de la llamada “arquitectura de seguridad nuclear” que comprende tanto los instrumentos legales a los que se hacía referencia como el trabajo institucional del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, también la tarea de Naciones Unidas incluyendo al Consejo de Seguridad a través del seguimiento de la Resolución 1540 y finalmente el trabajo de otras iniciativas, que se ocupan de temas similares o conexos como la Iniciativa Mundial para Combatir el Terrorismo Nuclear o el Partenairado Mundial sobre Armas de Destrucción en Masa.

También otra contribución importante es que tradicionalmente en todos los instrumentos se ponía el énfasis en que la responsabilidad primariamente de tipo nacional y a través de este tipo de procesos como la Cumbre se había venido destacando mucho más el componente de cooperación internacional. La importancia de que los estados intercambien experiencias y puedan mejorar su propia performance en base a compartir buenas prácticas con otros países. Todo esto sin duda ha dado un impacto en profundizar el trabajo muy importante que se venía desarrollando en el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica. La aparición de las Cumbres también logró reacomodar los mandatos de otras iniciativas que venían operando, las dos que yo mencioné: El Partenairado Global sobre Armas de Destrucción en Masa, que es una proyección de un grupo que trabajaba en el G8, ha cambiado sus mandatos, los ha ampliado para poder trabajar mucho más con el tema de seguridad nuclear y no tanto con el tema de no-proliferación tradicional. Y la Iniciativa Mundial para Combatir el Terrorismo Nuclear que mencioné, cambió también su mandato, dejó la tarea digamos de alto nivel para las Cumbres y empezó a desarrollar grupos de trabajo muy concretos, con mandatos específicos para poder desarrollar estándares. Todo esto contribuyó a que hubiera una mayor comprensión de la cuestión de seguridad nuclear como la otra cara de la no-proliferación tradicional. En la no-proliferación tradicional la preocupación era
que los estados adquieran armas nucleares y aquí la preocupación es que grupos no estatales –
terroristas o crimen organizado – puedan acceder a este tipo de armas. Quizás el impacto político
más trascendente y quizás el menos remarcado o reconocido está en la membrecía de las
Cumbres de Seguridad Nuclear.

En el esquema tradicional de no-proliferación el elemento decisivo era el ser parte del Tratado de
No Proliferación Nuclear y los tres países que no eran parte del Tratado de No Proliferación
Nuclear – India, Pakistán e Israel – estaban excluidos de cualquier debate de no-proliferación.

El asumir como prioridad el tema de la seguridad nuclear lleva a replantear también los asociados
de esa perspectiva y siendo el problema evitar el acceso de grupos no estatales a este tipo de
materiales, India, Pakistán e Israel forman parte del proceso. Hay un círculo en el esquema
mundial que los incorpora cuando tradicionalmente eran los excluidos. La paradoja es que entre
los cincuenta miembros que siguen el proceso hay tres estados poseedores de armas nucleares
que están fuera del TNP y hay muchos países con un record pacífico muy claro, que no forman
parte.

En lo también formal y operativo el proceso agregó un informe más a los países para cumplir, que
al principio era una cuestión voluntaria, pero que es importante porque todos los países lo hemos
 aceptado y que permite – como digo – ir más allá del marco de cada uno de estos componentes
desde la arquitectura de la seguridad nuclear y hacer un informe general sobre cómo el país se
compromete en un marco más amplio. Ya no solamente vía el OIEA o solamente el Consejo de
Seguridad. También está la figura más novedosa de los compromisos adicionales a través de las
llamadas canastas o baskets, que permiten que los estados profundicen sus obligaciones en
algunos campos.

Desde el punto de vista de la sustancia, el proceso de las Cumbres puso énfasis en elementos más
novedosos o menos conocidos de la temática de seguridad nuclear. Los temas tradicionales eran
la custodia de los materiales nucleares, la custodia de las fuentes radioactivas, las sinergias entre
seguridad tecnológica y seguridad física, la seguridad del transporte y las Cumbres agregan nuevo
énfasis en otras cuestiones, por ejemplo: la relación con Interpol, que era una cuestión que estaba
muy perdida, pasa a ocupar un lugar central y todos los esfuerzos que hace Interpol en materia de
no-proliferación y terrorismo en las cuatro variantes de armas de destrucción en masa: química,
biológica, radiológica y nuclear. Y la cuestión de la forénşica nuclear que es también un tema muy
importante y que es casi una novedad. Poder contar con registros de material nuclear que
permitan en caso de detectarse un caso de materiales, trazar el origen de ese material. Sin un
banco de forénşica que permita comparar es imposible detectar el origen de ese material que
puede ser parte de un tráfico ilegal hacia un grupo de actores no estatales. La cultura de la
seguridad nuclear, la seguridad de la información, una serie de temas que no estaban tan
centrales en la agenda previa de seguridad nuclear a través de las Cumbres pasaron a ocupar un
lugar equivalente.
Si hacemos un comentario fuera del estricto ámbito nuclear, toda esta reflexión de seguridad nuclear ya empieza a plantearse aplicada a la seguridad química. En el marco de la Convención de Armas Químicas ya hay todo un debate de cómo prevenir el uso de las sustancias químicas por parte de los actores no-estatales. En un proceso que recién empieza, que todos tenemos una experiencia previa que venimos tomando de lo nuclear, pero que sin embargo va a tener muchos más desafíos porque lo químico está mucho más difundido, hay mucho más involucramiento privado, está mucho más disperso en la industria.

La gran duda del proceso hacia el futuro es cómo continúa. Uno puede imaginar que determinados debates internacionales se dan por una vitalidad propia de la cuestión, que mueve al consenso a toda la amplia comunidad de estados o como se buscó en este caso, un grupo más reducido de países que tome el liderazgo y que le de impulso a la cuestión. Ese no es un tema menor, ese no es un tema menor y voy a volver sobre él un poco más adelante.

La segunda cuestión es que hasta ahora gran parte de la construcción de la agenda es: reagrupar esfuerzos que se venían realizando en diferentes ámbitos, tratar de presentarlos de una manera homogénea y en caso de duda ir al mínimo común denominador. Eso es muy común en los procesos multilaterales y hasta ahora nos ha permitido más o menos reagrupar y dar una cierta forma a la agenda de seguridad nuclear.

Un tema que permanece y que se trata de acomodar siempre es cómo podemos estandarizar un proceso como es el de seguridad nuclear, que en cada caso, en cada país, está basado en la evaluación de seguridad o de la amenaza que cada país realiza. Hay otras disciplinas en lo nuclear, por ejemplo, la seguridad radiológica en la cual está definido que para proteger a las personas o al medio ambiente de determinado tipo de materiales hay pautas científicas: determinados espesores, protecciones, medidas.

En el caso de la seguridad nuclear, respecto del terrorismo nuclear se parte de una amenaza de base, que cada país evalúa, entonces es muy difícil estandarizar en algunos casos, determinados parámetros para un país, por ejemplo, para un país que considera que tiene una alta amenaza porque involucramiento global, la presencia de materiales, o lo que sea, lo lleva a estar más expuesto y un país que puede estar más en la periferia geográfica, tiene menos material y a lo mejor puede considerar que determinados estándares son excesivos.

La clave y ya un poquito lo dije antes, me parece es cómo universalizamos los logros de un proceso que solamente involucra a cincuenta países.

Cada uno de estos pasos que fui mencionando que en la evaluación de la Argentina, son pasos muy positivos. Esta visión general es compartida por cincuenta países y los estándares se van profundizando en una dirección. Mientras tanto el OIEA, que es el organismo natural, sigue trabajando pero hay una diferencia: si comparamos, por ejemplo, el documento final de la Reunión Ministerial de 2013 con los documentos de la Cumbre – no es el caso de Argentina, pero
algunos países hicieron una comparación muy crítica, que por supuesto los documentos de la Cumbre son mucho más profundos, mucho más precisos, y que el documento que fue aprobado en esa reunión del OIEA tiene un carácter más general. Pero sin embargo, pese a su carácter más general tiene el enorme valor de que fue consensuado por más de ciento cincuenta países. De una manera o la otra teníamos una visión más positiva, se están produciendo como dos niveles de estándares y esto es muy complicado y me lleva a pensar que quizás el desafío más grande que tenemos por delante no está tanto en la sustancia, no está tanto en el establecimiento de estándares sino en cómo trasvasar lo que se va logrando en algunos ámbitos al ámbito más grande. Es como una teoría del péndulo, los grupos que trabajan – de números reducidos – son muy eficientes, pero tienen el problema a mayor eficiencia más dificultad para explicárselo a todos los demás que no estuvieron en la elaboración de las normas. Si uno, en el otro extremo, trabaja con la totalidad de la comunidad se es menos eficiente en el uso del tiempo y se avanza de manera más lenta. Siempre debemos encontrar un punto de equilibrio.

Este comentario que hago sobre la universalización, me parece que se ha hecho más serio o tiene consecuencias más importantes después de la última en La Haya. Por qué digo esto? Tradicionalmente cuando hablábamos de materiales a ser protegidos en el marco de la cumbre nos referíamos principalmente al material nuclear empleado en armas nucleares y al material nuclear en los programas de usos pacíficos y en menor medida nos referíamos al material radiológico que podía ser usado para contaminar el ambiente o en una bomba sucia combinado con un explosivo convencional.

Ese delicado balance entre las tres fuentes de riesgo, entre lo que no quiero dejar pasar que el verdadero riesgo lo constituyen los arsenales nucleares pero eso está acotado a un grupo reducido de países, este balance no digo que se rompió pero tomó otra perspectiva porque, como seguramente Uds. saben durante la cumbre se eligió un escenario para presentar a los líderes a través de una serie de videos que implicaban el desarrollo de un incidente y se iban planteando por un sistema muy fácil de manejar y muy simpático de computadoras, que los Jefes de Estado pudieran ir dando sus opciones de cómo resolver ese incidente.

Bueno, el incidente que se planteó fue el incidente de sustracción de una fuente radiológica. Entonces, si se está en el proceso de pensar solamente en armas nucleares o de materiales nucleares, bueno, un número de cincuenta países, más o menos los países que estaban ahí en el proceso son los que tienen o armas nucleares o materiales nucleares. Pero si expandimos el ejercicio a considerar las bombas de cobalto de los hospitales, ya afecta prácticamente a todos los países del mundo. Entonces es mucho más difícil imaginarnos un proceso de generar estándares o parámetros entre cincuenta para algo que, en la cosa cotidiana, en el day-by-day va a afectarlos a todos.

Quizás esa es en la perspectiva nuestra, el problema mayor, el tema de las armas nucleares, siempre se va a encontrar un lenguaje para reflejar acabadamente la preocupación, pero el problema es procesal. Nosotros tomamos debida nota y vemos de manera muy positiva las Cinco
Prioridades que fueron presentadas en un evento paralelo a la primera reunión de sherpas en Washington que fueron presentadas en esta reunión por Joan al principio.

Y como último comentario, tuvimos una reunión de sherpas después de la Cumbre, la reunión fue hace dos/tres semanas en Washington y en líneas generales todavía el dilema sigue sin solucionar porque estamos explorando maneras de trabajar en la sustancia, pero la forma en que esa sustancia se va a poder canalizar en los diferentes foros donde se trata la cuestión, universales, para lograr la aceptación del resto de la comunidad internacional, es un poco más complejo.

Cuesta pensar que un ejercicio de tanta sofisticación y con tanto esfuerzo, pueda simplemente plasmarse en que en el OIEA o en Naciones Unidas o en Interpol un grupo de cincuenta países simplemente presentemos una resolución encomiando determinados comportamientos. Ya si fuera solamente eso, habría un proceso sofisticado de lograr adhesiones. A la Argentina le parece que todos los países que participamos en este proceso o que estamos comprometidos con la temática, tenemos la obligación de tratar de explicar nuestra preocupación a otros países que quizás, por sus circunstancias nacionales no lo pueden ver así.

En ese contexto nosotros valoramos muy especialmente el trabajo que se hace en la Iniciativa Mundial para Combatir el Terrorismo Nuclear, que también es un club, pero en vez de tener solamente cincuenta miembros tiene casi noventa, con lo cual aproxima bastante más a la membresía de los órganos del OIEA y que puede servir como una cámara de transferencia para discutir las ideas en un ambiente más técnico, para relajar los espíritus, en el sentido de que no va a haber ningún grupo que le quiera imponer sus ideas a otro. Y en el marco de esta iniciativa Argentina organizó en la primera semana de agosto, con Chile, acá en Buenos Aires, un ejercicio Remex, un ejercicio de emergencia radiológica – el ejercicio se denominó Paihuén, que consistía en imaginar, perdón, digo Argentina con Chile, Chile y había representantes de más de treinta países, asistiendo al ejercicio como observadores e hicieron una especie de ejercicio paralelo después, consistía también – un poco replicando lo que vimos en La Haya en imaginar robos simultáneos de fuentes radiológicas a ambos lados de la frontera en la zona cercana y cómo reaccionarían las fuerzas de seguridad, de inteligencia, de policía, en ambos casos, si habría coordinación o no habría coordinación, cómo operarían los protocolos nacionales – Argentina es un país federal, tenemos autoridades provinciales, autoridades federales, autoridades locales, salud, etc. – y un poco la idea fue, invitando a otros países de América Latina, explicar de una manera, que no pretende ser condescendiente ni mucho menos, para tratar de compartir la experiencia de que la sustracción de una fuente le puede pasar a cualquiera, y que el uso de esa fuente por actores terroristas, si la fuente desaparece es una posibilidad real y que nadie está exento de que le suceda una cosa así. Muchísimas gracias.

Joan Rohlfing: Thank you very much, Gustavo. We have time now, about twenty minutes, to open the floor to questions that you may have, and I see that we have some microphones on the floor as well, so I would ask you to raise your hand, please, and we will call on you in turn. Yes...
Asistente: Buenas tardes, gracias. Yo soy Élida Bustos de la revista Latin Trade. La pregunta para el panel, un poco enganchada en lo que el Embajador Ainchil acaba de decir. En qué situación se está en estos momentos respecto del contrabando de material radioactivo, porque cada tanto sale en los diarios que se encontró algo, o que sale de los ex–países de la Unión Soviética, de las seis repúblicas soviéticas – cuál es la situación hoy en relación con hace unos años – se estabilizó? hay menos, aumentó no solamente el peligro hipotético, sino lo que realmente se está encontrando en estos momentos en distintos lugares? Gracias.

Joan Rohlfing: Thank you. Let me ask to Ronda if she wants to offer any response about radiological sources.

Rhonda: As some of you may be aware the IAEA maintains what it is called an incident database. It is a volunteer reporting mechanism, that countries around the world can report any incident of unauthorized possession, theft or movement, unauthorized movement of sources. The reports are merged to the incidents in traffic in database, and then are subsequently confirmed. Now of course, this is an under-complete record because not every country reports this, but you might be interested to know that in analytical reports that have been done by the Agency, 50% of those reports concern radioactive material which is not nuclear material. There are also a large number of reports of contaminated scrap metal, so the vast majority of reports actually concern radiological material or other radioactive material, and a very much smaller number concern nuclear material. The thing that you would have to say about that is that that could also be related to the detection capabilities in countries as well. It is much harder to detect nuclear material using some of the detection capabilities that countries have. But just in raw figures the in reports that we receive there is a very large number of radioactive sources, which are actually detected through being trafficked more indeed, in the next case also through contaminating scrap metal. So, has that answered your question? It is obviously incomplete because not every country reports those to the Agency.

Joan Rohlfing: I wish just to add to that, that at the 2014 Summit in The Hague, a number of countries came together in a joint commitment to try and secure all of their so-called Category 1 of radiological sources. So sources using the most dangerous materials, which there are thousands. And, Gustavo, you may recall the number of states – between one and two dozen, I think who signed on to that but this is a very promising sign.

Gustavo Ainchil: Un número importante de países en la Cumbre se sumaron a una canasta especial de compromisos en esto. El punto esencial acá, es adquirir conciencia del riesgo. En la medida que los países no adquieran conciencia de que eso puede representar un riesgo de seguridad y no solamente un riesgo accidental para la salud, que pueda haber un uso voluntario, malicioso de la fuente, en la medida en que no se produzca esa conciencia es muy difícil prevenir los incidentes. En la pregunta se hacía referencia a fuentes que podían provenir de caídas de ciertos regímenes, eso digamos que es como un legado histórico que hay que manejar. Pero las fuentes tienen un nivel de decaimiento, no duran para siempre. El problema es la sustracción de
fuentes que están operativas en los hospitales. Entonces, cada país tiene la responsabilidad de hacer su inventario y de instrumentar las medidas que sean necesarias para poder hacer el seguimiento de esas fuentes, cómo se usa, cómo se transporta. Si el país no tiene conocimiento, hay cooperaciones internacional, está el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, hay fuentes de cooperación bilateral. Una cosa que hubo hasta hace dos años, se terminaba de usar la fuente, la fuente no servía más para usos médicos pero todavía contaminaba y la fuente se deja en un contenedor aislante en la parte de atrás de un hospital, afuera en la calle, para que vengan después a juntarlo. Entonces, cualquier persona que se lleve esa fuente y abra, si es un accidente puede quedar contaminado, pero si es un grupo que se lleve esa fuente y sepa encontrar la manera – que no es muy difícil – de generar un atentado, ya simplemente el anuncio a la opinión pública de que una fuente ha estado expuesta fuera de un concierto de rock o fuera de un espectáculo deportivo o en un parque público, con solamente el anuncio ya, desde el punto de vista de un ataque terrorista, causaría un caos enorme sin llegar a la explosión. Se puede hacer muchísimo daño con muy poco. Entonces el compromiso de cada estado de proteger sus fuentes cierra la posibilidad de este tipo de incidentes.

Joan Rohlfing: Rhonda, are you going to add to this?

Rhonda Evans: Yes, thank you. That was also a very good leading to one of the non-binding legal instruments under the auspices of the IAEA, which is the Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of radioactive sources, for which there are about one hundred member states who are giving political commitment. And it is essentially about making short the radioactive sources and orderly safe from radiation protection point of view but also are secure, from the point of view of not causing harm even through loss or theft, or misplacement, or indeed because in some countries they were never under regulatory control in the first place. That is another very important element in your nuclear security national system, because many countries that are visited do not have nuclear materials or nuclear facilities, but they have a very, very large use of the radioactive sources, including the Category one and the Category two, which we must concern about. Thank you.

Joan Rohlfing: We have a question right down here, the first row? Would you, please, introduce yourself?

Asistente: My name is Álvaro Bermúdez, I am a part of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. You know, I have three subjects: one is that 85% that you explained very good, but I would like to hear a little bit more, especially for countries like my country, Uruguay. But could be one of these countries that could feel that it is safe and it is not. We really have a lot of problems in the borders, many times, we know that, but we must be aware of that 85% for sure, then if you can explain much more how it can be possible to control, to be transparent to the other states to have this kind of radiological material or fuel or whatever.
The other point is the real possibility of introducing more countries in the next Summit, especially because of what we were discussing today which was the different proposals that sometimes need some agreements of different countries and then there are pre-agreements, and then some proposal will be much more well received than others. So I follow the position of Gustavo that I think it is better if you have much more Latin American countries so to say, because we are here, but I think it is the way, the same problem all abroad.

And the third is the point that we were talking about the possibility in 2016 to really have some kind of standards that really can be used all round the world. Because I think that the issue is very complicate as you very good exposed: there are different positions for different countries. So you must look for one way that could give us, could catch the interest of other countries that are not so in the issue to enter in these kind of standards. And you know that for many countries it will be necessary to give a lot of help, and a lot of training and lot of equipment. You know, it is like that, usually it is like that, so it will be after the Summit a long work to do. So must be some kind of committee, some kind of work of the IAEA for sure the Agency is working for all of us, and then three points that may be you can give some something more for us. Thank you.

Joan Rohlfing: Thank you. Let me try to tackle the first of the three questions. And then turn to colleagues to help with the others and to add to the first if they’d like. On the question of the 85% and how can we succeed in achieving transparency over these materials within the states that have them, I would reflect that kind of really fundamental statement, an observation that Ian made, which is that we are really lacking some fundamentally the political will, to do something about these materials within the countries that hold them.

I would observe that all of us here today – whether we are citizens of countries that have military materials or citizens of countries that do not – we need to help make the case, for why it is essential to include the 85% to strengthen the security round those materials and find ways to build some transparency mechanisms and confidence around the status of those materials. A number of my colleagues in the U.S. government who were working on the Nuclear Security Summit have said: “we need help making the case for what we know military material becomes so essential.”

They have been working to lead this offered, and the British have joined with them, and supported some initiative on military materials. But they are having a tough time gathering support from many other nations with these materials in the context of the Summit and they keep saying: please, help us to make the case! We the U.S. and we Britain cannot be the only ones who recognize that this is important, so I think that we can all play a role there by helping to build the political will. I would like to add once more foot note: that the Nuclear Threat Initiative has just launched a study group of eminent experts and former political leaders representing states or from states that have these military materials to trying develop a set of recommendations for how states can tackle the very question that you raised, how can they both strengthen security, and bring about greater transparency.
Panel 3: Seguridad nuclear – Estrategias de prevención del terrorismo nuclear y el tráfico de materiales y tecnología
Transcripción completa de audio

And we have in the audience Des Browne who is one of the Co-chairs of that study group and invited you all to ask him more about it but we are hoping that within about six months that that study group not only help make the case, but also come out with concrete recommendations that Summit states can consider for implementation.

Let me turn to our other panelists and ask if anybody else, maybe... I would be curious to hear your views on both the standard questions and also the universality question: how do we introduce more states to the Summit? There might be a flippant to ask that question since the Summit process is ending. Is there a way that we get some IAEA states more engaged in adhering some of the commitments that were started in the context of the Summit?

And... to that end, Rhonda, maybe you can add a little more about the information circular process of the IAEA, because I am aware of some very encouraging development and near add is that there was a critical commitment in the group of thirty plus states of the Summit to strengthen on materials security through a range of different steps, and even though that commitment they has fasten in a joint statement signed by these thirty, I think thirty five countries. And even though a merge up of the Nuclear Security Summit it was introduced to the IAEA as an information circular, so it is valuable to us all states and it is possible for any IAEA member state to join in, to state support for that commitment. So I think there are ways to bring these processes together and have to universalize but I would be curious to hear from Rhonda her views.

Rhonda Evans: Sure, I am giving my views, not my personal view. The manner in which the Agency, of course, would take any of these matters forward is through its two main policy organs: a Board of Governors and the Members States through the General Conference process. And I think it would be very interesting to see what our member states what our Board of Governors give us as new directions, coming out of these very active whole of these dialogues that have been going on internationally. Although you probably did not have time to read this slide, in his statement at the last nuclear security summit, our Director General, of course, was very encouraged by the focus on the role of the IAEA in a central coordination for nuclear security assistance.

The issue in addition of universalization and standards again would become a policy matter for our member states in our Board of Governors. At the moment you would be aware that there is a clear distinction made between our safety standard series and our nuclear security guidance series, which, I do not think undermines the guidance contained in it if the states actually incorporate it into their national system. But rather, our member states are very clear, and they draw a distinction between the national standards – from the safety standard series and the nuclear security series guidance, because I think the fundamental premise is that nuclear security is a sovereign responsibility. But the issue of universalization is an interesting one, because I work with such a very large range of member states. And I think it is very true to say that the difficulty with a concept of universalization are the very large cultural, institutional and historical differences between states in the manner in which they approach some of these issues, so worth
you can give guidance on methodology or issues to consider. You never end up with exactly the same issues or approaches to risk reduction or indeed what is the tolerable level of risking a particular country. So I think some of the interesting debates into the future is: how we work toward a system which means that we reduce the risk of material coming out of regular tri-control to a very acceptable level, which goes back to the gentleman’s question about what the detection and the movement of materials, but also recognizing that the nuclear security sitting as it does with the national security paradigms, is a very interesting topic for members states to come to cope with and the manner in which they appropriate to share or not their approaches, which comes back to the transparency and accountability issue my colleague from Australia, Mr. Gareth Evans raised this morning as well. There is a really important dialogue to carry on in whichever forum which states have, through other Summits or indeed through the auspices of the Agency. I think it is a very dynamic discussion.

Joan Rohlfing: Gustavo, I know we are winding down to a last couple of minutes. So, I might also ask that as you comment on this you maybe offer any final comments, and I will also ask this to each of our few panelists, as an opportunity as well.

Gustavo Ainchil: Sí, aclarar – por supuesto -que para nosotros el camino de universalización, necesariamente es un camino que conduce al Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica. Me parece que la construcción de las Cumbres ha dado muchísimo, pero es el momento de que ese aporte se reconduzca en un organismo universal como es el Organismo de Energía Atómica. En esa transferencia se pueden usar muchas herramientas, muchas iniciativas. Yo no mencioné pero lo quiero hacer ahora, en el caso de nuestra región está el Foro Iberoamericano de Reguladores Nucleares, de Autoridades Reguladoras que es una herramienta para ir creando conciencia a nivel regional también. Para que todos los diferentes países en el OIEA y como decía muy bien recién Rhonda, hay diferentes percepciones, hay que desarrollar este click mental, esta toma de conciencia a nivel de las particularidades regionales. Todos los esfuerzos tienen que concluir en llegar a un mínimo o un razonable nivel, como decían recién. Pero es un proceso largo, donde todas las herramientas tienen que ser usadas, pero es nuestra opinión que esto debe ser exclusivamente en el sentido de reforzar el rol del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica.

Joan Rolhfing: Thank you very much. Let me just ask you if ah...Rhonda and Ian, if you have some any summary comments that you would like to make after, during the discussion and before we conclude. Ian...

Ian Kearns: Just back to, two brief points: First on the issue: how enlarge the Summit process to other countries? I was suggesting earlier that one method for extending the countries participating is to identify what you think the really important are, you were not currently there. I mean develop the national focus, political engagement strategy to get them. Now, in the case of Iran for example, there is a very live discussion about what else follows the possible day with Iran and its nuclear program, for example, it would then be encouraged to plan much more active role in helping to stop the civil war in Siria, etc., etc. So there I think, there a must appealing, that it is
essentially appealing to the Iranian government’s leadership to say a more active international role, you will be welcome into a more international role and be a more influential if you sign on the doctrine line in the nuclear deal. So, what I want to suggest is that deals can be made and when you give the countries what they want at the table, when you give them something else they want more they need, we can do some quickly thinking about that.

The second more technical fix, I think is to think about delegation. Certain countries can go for particular regions as delegates for the wider region or as delegates some other groupings or states, some common positions, in particular aspects of the challenge. And then, finally on the relationship on an issue of this 85% and the lack of political will. I think one of the big barriers that too many political leaders think, and afterwards acknowledge some of the weaknesses of their own systems in order to embrace this challenge. And I think we have to encourage them to do there is a need to impart a much wider dialogue sovereign in a way, as to encourage to say: the threat to us, citizens, does not necessarily come from what we are doing with our materials, it got to be a weakness somewhere else globally. And the only way we can attack that problem is by showing them that we are responsible sovereigns and building mutual assurance mechanisms with others, so that we can all rely on it, which is what we have to do in today’s global environment for our security.

Joan Rolhfing: Any final comment Rhonda?

Rhonda Evans: Just one final comment, and that is what the Agency want to say as observer to the Nuclear Security Summit. Certainly will look with interest at the outcome of the Summit, and then how this affect the next year International Nuclear Security Conference at a Ministerial Level to be held in December 2016, and that would be a significant input into the development of the next nuclear security plan going forward from 2018 to 2020-2021, rather. I think the Director General and indeed our Department Heads and its Division Head are very much looking forward the same, the influence that that can have to shape the next nuclear security plan in the twenties. Thank you.

Joan Rolhfing: Thank you very much. So, please, join me in thanking all three of our panelists.