International Seminar: Nuclear Challenges in the 2015 Global Security Agenda

Nuclear Security: Strategies for Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism and Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials and Technology

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What is the Threat?

• TERRORISTS HAVE STATED THEIR DESIRE TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
• AL QAEDA: GETTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS “A RELIGIOUS DUTY”
• 2000 TONS OF MATERIAL IN 25 COUNTRIES
What is the Threat?

• MANY SITES HAVE POOR SECURITY OR UNKNOWN CONDITIONS
• INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS STILL NOT PROPERLY ORGANIZED
• WE ARE ONLY AS STRONG AS THE WEAKEST LINK
The Problem Today

• No effective global system for securing these deadly materials

• Existing agreements, guidelines, and multilateral engagement mechanisms fall short
  – no international standards
  – not all material covered
  – no accountability mechanism
Key elements include:

• **All weapons-usable nuclear materials and facilities** should be covered by the system.

• All states and facilities with those materials **should adhere to international standards and best practices.**

• States should help **build confidence in the effectiveness of their security practices** and take **reassuring actions** to demonstrate that all nuclear materials and facilities are secure.

• States should work to reduce risk through **minimizing** or, where feasible, **eliminating weapons-usable nuclear materials stocks** and the number of locations where they are found.
Military materials comprise 85% of all global weapons-usable nuclear materials.

The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit reaffirmed:

“...the fundamental responsibility of States . . . to maintain at all times effective security of all nuclear and other radioactive materials, including nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities under their control.”

Existing international nuclear security mechanisms do not provide specific security standards or any oversight for military materials, and there are no regular best practice exchanges or peer review for these materials.
Note: The total weapons-usable nuclear material inventory is estimated at 1,440 metric tons of HEU and 495 metric tons of separated plutonium. Of this, 1,400 metric tons of HEU and 240 metric tons of plutonium are estimated to be outside of civilian programs. The estimated range of uncertainty regarding the total quantity of materials is +/- 140 metric tons.

Note: As of the end of 2011, the total weapons-usable nuclear material inventory is estimated at 1,440 metric tons of HEU and 495 metric tons of separated plutonium. Of this, 1,400 metric tons of HEU and 240 metric tons of plutonium are estimated to be outside of civilian programs. The estimated range of uncertainty regarding the total quantity of materials is +/- 140 metric tons.

Global Stockpile: HEU and Plutonium

HEU, 1440±130 MT

Plutonium, 495±10 MT

- Military programs
- Civilian programs
While the international community greatly reduced civilian HEU inventories, separated plutonium inventories have continued to rise.
FIVE Priorities for the 2016 Summit

1. Make the global nuclear security regime comprehensive
2. Share information to build global confidence
3. Implement measurable best practices and standards
4. Offer plans for eliminating civil HEU and reducing plutonium
5. Create a sustainable mechanism for continuous progress